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This Article's objective is to spark discussion about the standards by which we 
judge international courts. Traditional justifications for the authority of international 
courts are based on outmoded assumptions of their role and impact. State consent and 
procedural fairness to litigants are insufficient to ground the legitimacy of institutions 
that may adjudicate the international rights and duties of non litigants, deeply affect the 
interests of non litigating stakeholders, and shape the law prospectively. These realities 
mandate a new approach to the legitimacy of international courts. This Article presents 
alternative or additional approaches for justifying the authority of international courts 
rooted in both procedure and substance. First, legitimacy requires a reimagining of 
procedural fairness to include those whose international rights and duties are being 
adjudicated by international courts. Democratic theory can help to justify the authority 
of international courts so long as stakeholders are given the opportunity to participate 
in the formulation of policies that affect them. In addition, international courts must 
adhere to certain universal standards of justice. They cannot facilitate the violation of 
a set of core norms, including prohibitions against torture, slavery, racial 
discrimination, and genocide, and still retain their legitimacy. Finally, the extent to 
which an international court implements the objectives it was created for also affects 
its legitimacy. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................. 62 
II. BREAKING THE MOLD ........................................................................................ 65 
A. The Mold: State Consent and Procedural Fairness To the Litigants ......... 65 
B. Why the Mold Is Broken .......................................................................... 68 
1. Changes in the Role and Impact ofIntemational Courts ................... 68 
• Assistant Professor, University of Baltimore School of Law. BA, Harvard College; JD, Harvard Law 
School; LLM, Georgetown University Law Center. The author wishes to thank for their excellent comments 
Harlan Grant Cohen, Evan Criddle, Claudio Grossman, Alexandra Huneeus, Harold Hongjuh Koh, Christopher 
1. Peters, Mortimer' Sellers, John Tasioulas, and Markus Wagner, and Ezequiel Steiner for his support 
throughout this project. In addition, the author benefitted greatly from feedback received at the University of 
Baltimore School of Law's Junior Faculty Forum, the 2012 Junior International Law Scholars Association 
meeting, the 2012 ASIL-ESIL·Rechtskulturen Workshop on Transatlantic Debates in International Legal 
Theory at the University of Cambridge, UK, the 2012 ASIL Research Forum at the University of Georgia, and 
the 2013 Harvard-Stanford-Yale Junior Faculty Forum. She is grateful to Emily Rogers, Jeffrey Sadri, George 
Dane Weber, and Amanda Webster for their research assistance, as well as for the University of Baltimore 
School of Law's summer research grant. 
61 
62 TEMPLELAWREVIEW [Vol. 86 
2. Why These Changes Render Traditional Approaches 
Anachronistic ..................................................................................... 76 
III. A NEW ApPROACH TO NORMATIVE LEGITIMACY ............................................... 79 
A. Reimagining Procedural Fairness ............................................................. 81 
1. Right To a Hearing in Dispute Resolution Proceedings ..................... 81 
a. International versus domestic courts and the right to a 
hearing ........................................................................................ 81 
b. The right to a hearing for individuals ......................................... 82 
c. What kind of right requires a hearing? ....................................... 84 
d. What kind of hearing is required? .............................................. 86 
e. What if a conflict arises? ............................................................ 86 
2. Stakeholder Participation in Judicial Law or Policy Making ............. 87 
a. Participation in the conduct of public affairs ................................. 88 
b. International courts and the conduct of public affairs .................... 90 
c. Who gets to participate and can enhanced participation be 
antidemocratic? .......................................................................... 92 
d. What does participation in the conduct of public affairs 
look like? .................................................................................... 94 
B. What About Justice (or Substantive Legitimacy)? ................................... 96 
1. A Minimum Core Set of Human Rights ............................................ 97 
2. Linking the Core Rights to Legitimacy and Counterarguments ....... .lOO 
3. Institutional Reforms ........................................................................ 102 
C. Achieving Normative Goals .................................................................... 103 
IV. CONCLUSION .................................................................................................... 104 
I. INTRODUCTION 
International courts and tribunals are deciding more disputes involving sovereign 
states than ever before. They find facts, identify and interpret relevant rules, fill gaps 
and ambiguities in the law, and apply rules to facts. International court judges are of 
diverse citizenship, and they are charged with discerning the international 
responsibility of sovereigns and awarding remedies as mandated by international law. 
They include the International Court of Justice (lCJ), the World Trade Organization's 
(WTO) Dispute Settlement Body, ad hoc tribunals under the auspices of the 
International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (lCSID), the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECHR), and many others. 1 The implications of their decisions, 
however, often go far beyond determining the rights and responsibilities of the 
litigating parties in a particular case. They decide who has the right to exploit natural 
resources and under what conditions, defme the scope of our human rights, delimit 
international boundaries, and determine when the use of force is prohibited. 
I. This Article focuses on international adjudicative bodies where at least one of the litigants is a 
sovereign. Consequently, it does not include international criminal courts, where sovereigns are not litigants. 
Although they too are international courts, they are involved in the determination of individual rather than state 
responsibility. 
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International courts no longer merely decide one-time disputes before them. They 
shape and promote specific normative regimes like international investment, human 
rights, humanitarian law, and trade law. Although international court decisions are not 
formally binding, advocates before them, scholars, politicians, and judicial opinions 
frequently cite them as if stare decisis were the prevailing rule. Even if one rejects the 
value of international court decisions as binding precedent, it is difficult to deny the 
influence of prior opinions in framing future ones.2 Political actors invoke international 
court opinions as if they constitute law, even when merely advisory.3 Judgments can 
provide a focal point around which interested parties like nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs), other states, and domestic and transnational constituencies can 
mobilize.4 Even for states not involved in a particular legal dispute, international court 
decisions shape the standards by which their behavior is judged prospectively. 
Unsurprisingly, as international courts' numbers and influence grow, so too do 
challenges to their legitimacy. For example, with the burgeoning number of 
international investment law arbitrations, legitimacy critiques are abundant.5 Similarly, 
the WTO literature is rife with concerns about institutional legitimacy.6 We may be 
seeing renewed attention to the IeJ because of its growing case load and perceptions of 
its great influence on international law. By failing to understand and respond to 
legitimacy concerns, we endanger both the courts and the law they interpret and apply. 
If international courts lack justified authority, so too will their interpretations of 
international law. To the extent we want international courts to continue to serve as a 
forum for the resolution of disputes involving sovereigns, we must preserve their 
legitimacy. Because no world legislature exists to counterbalance the decisions of 
international courts, and no worldwide police force enforces them, international courts' 
legitimacy is all the more essential to their success. 
This Article's goals are twofold. First, it seeks to break the mold of previous 
theories of normative legitimacy of international courts. The Article focuses on 
normative legitimacy for two reasons. Normative legitimacy provides a standard by 
2. See Marc Jacob, Precedents: Lawmaking Through International Adjudication, 12 GERMAN L.J. 1005, 
lOIS (2011) (addressing both the restrictive and guiding properties of precedent on future opinions); Joel P. 
Trachtman & Philip M. Moremen, Costs and Benefits of Private Participation in WTO Dispute Settlement: 
Whose Right Is It Anyway?, 44 HARv. iNT'L L.J. 221, 223 (2003) (noting that even though stare decisis does 
not apply in WTO litigation, judicial opinions often have some legislative force, filling in gaps left open by 
treaty writers and legislators); Armin von Bogdandy & Ingo Venzke, In Whose Name? An Investigation of 
International Courts' Public Authority and Its Democratic Justification, 23 EUR. J. INT'L L. 7, 18 (2012) 
(stating that some international courts have certain coercive mechanisms that require adherence to precedent in 
future decisions). 
3. See infra notes 37-41 and accompanying text for examples. 
4. KAREN ALTER, THE NEW TERRAIN OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 16-
17). 
5. See, e.g., David D. Caron, Investor State Arbitration: Strategic and Tactical Perspectives on 
Legitimacy, 32 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'LL. REv. 513,515-16 (2009) (noting multiple legitimacy critiques of the 
system of investor state arbitration); Bruno Simma, Foreign Investment Arbitration: A Place for Human 
Rights?, 60 INT'L & COMPo L.Q. 573, 573 (2011) (stating that the legitimacy of international investment 
treaties and arbitration has been attacked in recent years). 
6. See, e.g., Jeffery Atik, Democratizing the WTO, 33 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REv. 451,452-53 (2001) 
(asserting that public interest groups, public intellectuals, and trade scholars have all ''underscored the WTO's 
legitimacy problem"). 
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which to judge an international court and to decide whether it merits SUpport.7 It seeks 
to identify what qualities provide international courts with the "right to rule" or what 
justifies their authority.s It is objective and rooted in philosophy or political theory.9 In 
addition, normative legitimacy can influence sociological legitimacy, or perceptions of 
justified authority, and thereby, the extent to which we undergird or undercut the work 
of international COurtS.1O If international actors perceive an international court as 
illegitimate, they can de fund the court, ignore its decisions, or render its rulings 
irrelevant. While legitimacy is not the only normative standard by which international 
courts can be judged, it is a vital one. It tells us why a state should obey a court's ruling 
even if it may run contrary to the state's perceived interests to do so. It allows for the 
coordination of support by many different actors because it is based in moral, rather 
than strategic or self-interested reasons.ll Normative legitimacy can help identify 
where international courts are lacking and what can be done to strengthen them. 
As Section II explains, traditional approaches to normative legitimacy are based 
on outmoded assumptions about the effects of international court decisions beyond the 
litigating parties and the purposes of international adjudication. The beneficiaries of 
international court decisions include a multitude of actors not immediately before a 
court in a particular case, such as states, individuals, peoples, and corporations. 
International adjudication's underlying goals have changed dramatically since the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries from an almost exclusive focus on state-to-
state dispute settlement to prevent war to something much more complex. The 
objectives of international adjudicative bodies today include the advancement of 
particular normative goals like the promotion of human rights or trade and the 
maintenance of cooperative arrangements. 12 We must acknowledge these realities and 
their implications. The predominant approaches to normative legitimacy are 
anachronistic. 
The second objective of this Article, in Section III, is to propose a new theory of 
7. See Allen Buchanan & Robert O. Keohane, The Legitimacy of Global Governance Institutions, 20.4 
ETHICS & INT'L AFFAIRS 405, 405-{)6 (2006) (suggesting that a global public standard of legitimacy can help 
citizens distinguish legitimate institutions from illegitimate ones). 
8. Id. at 405; Daniel Bodansky, The Legitimacy of International Governance: A Coming Challenge for 
International Environmental Law?, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 596, 601 (1999). 
9. Daniel Bodansky, The Concept of Legitimacy in International Law, in LEGITIMACY IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 309, 313 (Rtldiger Wolfrum & Volker ROben eds., 2008). 
10. See Bodansky, supra note 8, at 601 (asserting that popular views about an authority comprise one 
dimension of that authority'S legitimacy); Buchanan & Keohane, supra note 7, at 405 ("An institution is 
legitimate in the sociological sense when it is widely believed to have the right to rule."); Richard H. Fallon Jr., 
Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 HARv. 1. REv. 1787, 1795 (2005) (discussing legitimacy as a 
sociological concept and defming it as whether the relevant public views the authority as justified or 
appropriate). Sociological legitimacy is drawn from the work of Max Weber. MAx WEBER, MAx WEBER ON 
LAW IN ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 5 (Max Rheinstein ed., Edward Shils & Max Rheinstein trans., Harvard 
University Press 1969); Nienke Grossman, Legitimacy and International Adjudicative Bodies, 41 GEO. WASH. 
INT'LL. REv. 107, 116 (2009); Alan Hyde, The Concept of Legitimation in the Sociology of Law, 1983 WIS. 1. 
REv. 379, 380-82 (1983). Sociological legitimacy is subjective, agent relative, and dynamic, and can be tested 
by empirical research. Grossman, supra, at 116-17; Bodansky, supra note 9, at 313. 
II. Buchanan & Keohane, supra note 7, at 409. 
12. Yuval Shany, No Longer a Weak Department of Power? Reflections on the Emergence of a New 
International Judiciary, 20 EURO. J.lNT'L L. 73, 76 (2009). 
2013] THE NORMATIVE LEGITIMACY OF INTERNATIONAL COURTS 65 
normative legitimacy for international courts. Legitimacy is a complex concept, and 
many different elements contribute to it. Identifying all of them is a Herculean, if not 
impossible, task. This Article proposes procedural and substantive requirements. First, 
a theory of legitimacy of international courts must, at a minimum, recognize the role 
and rights of actors beyond the state and the changed purposes of international 
adjudication. Specifically, legitimacy requires a reimagining of procedural fairness to 
include nonlitigants and nonstate parties, whose international rights and duties are 
being adjudicated by international courts, and stakeholders, when courts are engaged in 
law or policy making. Further, international courts' legitimacy turns, in part, on their 
ability to help states do a better job of complying with a core set of human rights 
obligations than states would in their absence. I3 Also, international courts cannot 
facilitate the violation by states of these core norms and retain their legitimacy. Finally, 
legitimacy hinges on how well courts further the underlying purposes of the normative 
regimes they were established to interpret and apply. 
Despite the proliferation of international courts and tribunals, "no new theory 
accompanies them. We continue to think about international adjudication in view of 
ideas and proposals dating back to around the turn of the twentieth century."14 The 
purpose of this Article is to challenge prevailing assumptions about the normative 
legitimacy of international adjudicative bodies and to begin a discussion about the 
standards by which they should be judged. 
II. BREAKING THE MOLD 
A. The Mold: State Consent and Procedural Fairness to the Litigants 
State consent is one traditional approach to normative legitimacy. The idea is that 
international institutions, including international adjudicative bodies, derive legitimacy 
from the consent of states to their jurisdiction. IS The state consent approach legitimates 
authority by focusing on its sources or origins. 16 So long as states consent to it, 
authority is justified. Because states are sovereign and independent, an international 
13. See infra Part III.B.2 for this Article's adoption of an instrumentalist approach to legitimacy inspired 
by Joseph Raz's "service conception" of authority. Raz describes the service conception as a "normative 
doctrine about the conditions under which authority is legitimate and the manner in which authorities should 
conduct themselves." JOSEPH RAz, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 63 (1986); see also John Tasioulas, 
Parochialism and the Legitimacy of International Law, in PAROCHIALISM, COSMOPOLITANISM, AND THE 
FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 16, 19 (M.N.S. Sellers ed., 2012); Lukas H. Meyer & Pranay 
Sank1echa, Introduction, to LEGITIMACY, JUSTICE AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 5-8 (Lukas H. Meyer, 
ed., 2009). 
14. Martti Koskenniemi, The Ideology of International Ac(judication and the 1907 Hague Conference, in 
TOPICALITY OF THE 1907 HAGUE CONFERENCE, THE SECOND PEACE CONFERENCE 127, 127 (Yves Daudet ed., 
2008); see also Artnin von Bogdandy & Ingo Venzke, Beyond Dispute: International Judicial Institutions as 
Lawmakers, 12 GERMAN L.J. 979,980 (2011) (asserting that "neither theory nor doctrine has yet adequately 
captured" the increase in volume or change in development ofintemational COU1'tS). 
IS. JAN KLABBERS ET AL., THE CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 39 (2009); Meyer & 
Sanklecha, supra note 13, at 4; Bodansky, supra note 8, at 597, 605; Buchanan & Keohane, supra note 7, at 
412-13. 
16. RUdiger Wolfrum, Legitimacy of International Law from a Legal Perspective: Some Introductory 
Considerations, in LEGITIMACY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 9, at I, 6. 
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adjudicative body cannot justify the exercise of its power to decide disputes involving 
states without their agreement. In the words of the Permanent Court of International 
Justice, the predecessor court to the ICJ: 
This rule, moreover, only accepts and applies a principle which is a 
fundamental principle of international law, namely, the principle of the 
independence of States. It is well established in international law that no 
State can, without its consent, be compelled to submit its disputes with other 
States either to mediation or to arbitration, or to any other kind of pacific 
settlement. I? 
More recently, in Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation),18 the ICJ stressed the 
importance of the "fundamental principle of consent."19 
In the same vein, a court that acts beyond the scope of the authority delegated by 
states, or ultra vires, lacks legitimacy.2o Also called "legality" or "legal legitimacy," it 
too traces to state consent.21 When states submit to the jurisdiction of a court, they do 
so under a specified set of conditions and expectations of the court's power. These 
conditions are established in a court's statute or in an arbitration agreement or 
compromis. For example, states may prescribe the sources of law that a court must rely 
upon. Article 38 of the Statute of the ICJ contains the canonical list of the sources the 
court "shall apply."22 Similarly, the Convention on the Settlement of Investment 
Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States provides that arbitral tribunals 
must 
decide a dispute in accordance with such rules of law as may be agreed by 
the parties. In the absence of such agreement, the Tribunal shall apply the 
law of the Contracting State party to the dispute (including its rules on the 
conflict oflaws) and such rules of international law as may be applicable.23 
If a court were to apply some other source of law, it would disrespect the boundaries 
prescribed by state consent, and its authority would lack justification. Again, the key to 
authority is the consent of states. A court that evades or ignores the limitations placed 
upon its authority by states threatens its legitimacy. 
The frame of reference for analyzing the grant and scope of consent is almost 
17. Status of Eastern Carelia, Advisory Opinion, 1923 P.C.U. (ser. B) No. 5, ~ 33 (July 23); see also 
Armed Activities on Territory of Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Rwanda), Provisional Measures, 2002 I.C.J. 
220, 220 (fmding that litigating states must grant consent for the ICJ to adjudicate their disputes); Monetary 
Gold Removed from Rome in 1943 (It. v. Fr., U.K., U.S.), Preliminary Question, 1954 I.C.J. 19,34 (June 15) 
(noting that the ICJ cannot determine the international responsibility of a state without its consent). 
18. Preliminary Objections, 2011 I.CJ. I (Apr. I). 
19. Elimination of Racial Discrimination, 2011 I.C.J. ~ 131. 
20. Bodansky, supra note 8, at 605. 
21. Id. at 605. 
22. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, June 26, 1945,33 U.N.T.S. 993 [hereinafter ICJ 
Statute]; H. Vern Clemons, Comment, The Ethos of the International Court of Justice Is Dependent upon the 
Statutory Authority Attributed to Its Rhetoric: A Metadiscourse, 20 FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 1479, 1486-87 
(1996). 
23. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States 
art. 42, opened for signature Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 186 [hereinafter ICSID 
Convention]. 
2013] THE NORMATIVE LEGITIMACY OF INTERNATIONAL COURTS 67 
always the state, and no other entity or person. Courts consider whether a state has 
consented and analyze the scope of that consent. Even in bodies where nonstate actors 
may sue states, such as the ECHR and ICSID, jurisdiction still rests on an expression of 
state consent. 24 
A second traditional approach to legitimacy focuses on the fairness and adequacy 
of decision-making processes.25 While the state consent approach derives legitimacy 
from the origins of authority, the process approach links the legitimacy of a court to the 
processes it uses to render decisions.26 The idea is that the rulings of a court with fair 
and impartial adjudicators and processes are worthy of respect, while those from unfair 
judges and processes are not. An international adjudicative body that operates by rules 
that ensure fairness and impartiality to the litigating parties is more legitimate than one 
that is biased against one of the litigating parties or fails to afford them equal 
opportunities to be heard.27 
A legitimate process will provide litigants with equal opportunities to present their 
views both orally and in writing and to respond to the views of the opposing party. 
Then, an open-minded adjudicator will assess the arguments and produce a judgment 
that one or both litigants may disagree with, but is authoritative nonetheless.28 
Procedural fairness is associated with the principle of audi alteram partem, literally, 
24. E.g., European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 25, 
Nov. 4,1950,213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter ECHR]; ICSID Convention, supra note 23, art. 25. 
25. See THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS 7 (1995) (discussing 
both procedural and substantive fairness); Bodansky, supra note 8, at 612 (stating that "authority can be 
legitimate because it involves procedures considered to be fair"); lH.H. Weiler, The Rule of Lawyers and the 
Ethos of Diplomats: Reflections on the Internal and External Legitimacy of WTO Dispute Selliement, 35 J. 
WORLD TRADE 191,204 (2001) (explaining that the legitimacy of courts is largely based on their ability "to 
listen to the parties, to deliberate impartially favoring neither the powerful nor the meek, to have the courage to 
decide and then, crucially, to motivate and explain the decisions"). 
26. Rudiger Wolfrum identifies source-, procedure-, and result-oriented approaches for legitimating 
authority. Wolfrum, supra note 16, at 6. 
27. See Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Acijudication, 92 HARV. L. REv. 353,382 (1978) 
(arguing that the integrity of adjudication must be judged by whether "the meaning of the affected party's 
participation in the decision by proofs and reasoned arguments" is adversely affected); Application for Review 
of Judgment No. 158 of United Nations Administrative Tribunal, Advisory Opinion, 1973 I.C.J. 166, 179 (July 
12) ("The principle of equality of the parties follows from the requirements of good administration of justice." 
(quoting Judgments of Administrative Tribunal of International Labour Organisation upon Complaints Made 
Against United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organisation, Advisory Opinion, 1956 I.C.J. 77, 
86 (Oct. 23»); MARTIN SHAPIRO, COURTS: A COMPARATIVE AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS I (1981) (discussing 
the "ideal type" of courts, involving "an independent judge" and "adversary proceedings," among other 
elements); Application for Review of Judgment No. 158 of United Nations Administrative Tribunal, Advisory 
Opinion, 1973 I.C.J. 166, 179 (July 12) ("The principle of equality of the parties follows from the 
requirements of good administration of justice." (quoting Judgments of Administrative Tribunal of 
International Labour Organisation upon Complaints Made Against United Nations Educational Scientific and 
Cultural Organisation, Advisory Opinion, 1956 I.C.J. 77, 86 (Oct. 23»; Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits 
of Acijudication, 92 HARV. L. REv. 353, 382 (1978) (arguing that the integrity of adjudication must be judged 
by whether "the meaning of the affected party's participation in the decision by proofs and reasoned 
arguments" is "adversely affected"). 
28. Martin Shapiro calls this the "triad." SHAPIRO, supra note 27, at 1-2. The further one moves away 
from the characteristics of the triad, the greater the challenges to a court's legitimacy. Id. 
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"[IJisten to the other side."29 It requires that international courts, like domestic ones, 
treat all parties equally and provide equal opportunities for advocacy.3o In the words of 
the ICJ, such principles "are integral constituents of the rule of law and justice."31 Fair 
process focuses on the litigants before a tribunal in a particular case, not on interested 
or potentially affected parties beyond the courtroom. The approach assumes, too, that 
open-minded and impartial adjudicators exist and that we can construct impartial 
benches. 
An alternative approach to the legitimacy of international courts is to apply a 
justice lens to outcomes. Even if states consent to adjudication and procedures are fair, 
a court that makes immoral or unjust rulings lacks legitimacy. This approach differs 
from the consent and process approaches because it focuses on institutional outputs, 
rather than what engenders them. It assumes that an objective and universal standard of 
justice exists and is discernible. Because many scholars have shied away from justice in 
assessing the legitimacy of international courts, it is not included within the "traditional 
approaches" critiqued below, but rather is addressed in Part III.B. 
B. Why the Mold Is Broken 
1. Changes in the Role and Impact of International Courts 
The traditional approaches to normative legitimacy of international courts rest on 
at least two flawed assumptions. The first is that international courts affect only the 
litigants in a particular case. The second is that international courts' primary role is to 
resolve one-time disputes between state actors. These assumptions are either too simple 
or just plain wrong. First, the influence of international courts extends far beyond the 
litigating parties because international courts make law that is used by other courts and 
nonlitigants. International courts shape the obligations of states prospectively and 
impact both state and nonstate actors not before the court. Second, rather than solely 
deciding narrow disputes between states, international courts explicitly promote 
specific normative re.gimes like human rights or free trade. These realities have serious 
implications for traditional approaches to normative legitimacy. 
International court decisions influence the development of law and politics. "The 
de facto lawmaking role played by international judges cannot be denied."32 Judges, 
lawyers, scholars, and politicians use previous international court decisions to support 
their legal arguments and to justify policy decisions. A quick read of almost any 
international court's opinions shows that judges cite and place weight on their own 
29. AARON X. FELLMETH & MAURICE HORWITZ, GUIDE TO LATIN IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 41 (2009). 
30. ld. 
31. Request for Examination of Situation in Accordance with Paragraph 63 of Court's Judgment of 20 
December 1974 in Nuclear Tests Case (N.Z. v. Fr.), 1995I.C.J. 288, 325 (Sept. 22). 
32. DANIEL TERRIS ET AL., THE INTERNATIONAL JUDGE: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE MEN AND WOMEN 
WHO DECIDE THE WORLD'S CASES 115-17 (2007) (discussing a number of different examples, ranging from 
the European and Inter-American human rights courts' contribution to the development of human rights law 
"far beyond what the original drafters [of the respective conventions I might have conceived," to the role of the 
European Court of Justice in European integration, to the WTO Appellate Body's inclusion of other areas of 
international law within its jurisdiction); see also von Bogdandy & Venzke, supra note 14, at 979 (stating that 
international judicial decisions influence future decisions). 
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court's previous decisions.33 International judges admit that they examine and consider 
other courts' decisions when relevant. Fonner vice president of the ICJ, Judge Guy de 
Lacharriere stated: "There is a body of international jurisprudence. When a case is 
presented to an international tribunal, be it our own tribunal or any ad hoc arbitration 
tribunal, the judge, the members of this tribunal, draw constantly from the international 
jurisprudence."34 Fonner ICJ Judge Thomas Buergenthal acknowledged, 
Contrary to what one would think, we at the ICJ do read decisions of other 
courts that bear on what we are doing. And even though we don't cite 
them-I've written and said we should cite them, but we don't cite them-
we do read them, and we take different views into account when they are 
relevant. 35 
Further, a number of courts, including the ICJ, have cited the opinions of other courts. 
The Andean Tribunal of Justice has repeatedly referenced the European Court of 
Justice's (ECJ) jurisprudence on the preemptive power and supremacy of community 
law and intellectual property law.36 In EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat 
Products (Hormones),3? the WTO Appellate Body cited the ICJ's judgment in 
GabCikovo-Nagymaros Project (HungaryISlovakiaj38 on the legal status of the 
precautionary principle.39 The ICJ quoted the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
fonner Yugoslavia on the meaning of intent to commit genocide.4o 
Lawyers, too, cite decisions of other courts or previous decisions of the same 
court in making legal arguments.41 Although judicial opinions are supposed to be only 
33. See MOHAMED SHAHABUDDEEN, PRECEDENT IN THE WORLD COURT 29-31 (1996) ("The cumulative 
effect of these and other instances is to establish, first, the existence of a case law of the Court, and second, the 
practical importance which the Court attaches to the maintenance of consistency in its holdings. As to the first 
point, the Court is itself on record as treating its previous decisions as constituting 'the case-law of the 
Court'."); von Bogdandy & Venzke, supra note 14, at 981 (discussing the development of international 
investment law as judge-made law). 
34. GARRY STURGESS & PHILIP CHUBB, JUDGING THE WORLD: LAW AND POLITICS IN THE WORLD'S 
LEADING COURTS 458 (1988). 
35. TERRIS ET AL., supra note 32, at 98. 
36. Ricardo Vigil Toledo, EI reflejo de la jurisprudencia europea en los fallos del Tribunal 
de Justicia de la Comunidad Andina: aspectos te6ricos y pragmaticos [European Jurisprudence as Reflected in 
Judgments of the Court of Justice of the Andean Community: Theoretical and Pragmatic Aspects] 1-4 (Feb. 
10, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.upf.eduiconstitucional/actualitatlPDFs/abstracts/ 
Vigil.pdf; see also Karen J. Alter & Laurence R. Helfer, Nature or Nurture? Judicial Lawmaking in the 
European Court of Justice and the Andean Tribunal of Justice, 64 INT'L ORG. 563, 570 (2010) (observing that 
the Andean Tribunal of Justice in its first case declared the supremacy of Andean law by citing a decision of 
the European Court of Justice that obligated national courts to enforce community law). 
37. Appellate Body Report, WTIDS26/ABIR, WTIDS48/ABIR (Jan. 16, 1998). 
38. Judgment, 1997 I.C.J. 7 (Sept. 25). 
39. Meat Products Report, ~ 123, WTIDS26/ABIR, WTIDS48/ABIR (citing GabNkovo-Nagymaros 
Project (Hung'/Slovk.), Judgment, 1997 I.C.J. 7, ~ 111-114, 140). 
40. Application of Convention on Prevention and Punishment of Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. 
Serb. & Montenegro), Judgment, 2007 I.C.J. 43, ~ 188 (Feb. 26). 
41. For example, in Questions of Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matter (Djibouti v. France), in the ICJ, 
counsel for both France and Djibouti cited a number of ICSID arbitral tribunal awards in discussing self-
judging clauses in treaties. E.g., Certain Questions of Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (Djib. v. Fr.), 
2008 I.C.J. Pleadings 24 (Jan. 29, 2008) (citing CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/01/8, Award, ~ 371 (May 12, 2005)); Certain Questions of Mutual Assistance in Criminal 
70 TEMPLE LA W REVIEW [Vol. 86 
a "subsidiary means" for the determination of international law,42 academics and 
renowned publicists rely on international court decisions when restating international 
legal principles or engaging in the progressive development of international law. For 
example, the International Law Commission makes reference to the decisions of 
international adjudicative bodies, especially the ICI, in drafting international treaties 
for states' consideration and adoption.43 Political bodies like the United Nations 
General Assembly use even merely advisory opinions to pressure states. The United 
Nations General Assembly used the ICI's advisory opinion in Legal Consequences of 
the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory« to "demand[]" that 
Israel comply with the opinion, by a vote of 150 to 6, even though Israel never 
consented to the jurisdiction of the court.4S Advisory opinions not only shape political 
conditions but also contribute to the development of international legal principles.46 
International court opinions, too, can serve as focal points to mobilize domestic and 
international interest groups in favor of or against a particular policy.47 
International judicial decisions can either directly or indirectly affect a broad 
range of stakeholders not immediately before the court, such as other states, peoples, 
individuals, and corporations. Indeed, some judges admit that international court 
decisions are intended to have impacts beyond the litigating parties at the time they are 
written. Former ICI judge and president, Manfred Lachs, commented that: 
[Y]ou do not only decide the dispute between state A and state B, you 
perform an educational function. You indicate to states A and B how their 
dispute should be solved, but you also give a wider background to all nations 
so that similar issues, or related issues, should be solved in a similar way.48 
Lachs advocated the articulation of obiter dicta, or articulated general principles 
unnecessary to resolve the dispute, to clarify the law and provide guidance to states 
about their responsibilities to the international community.49 Similarly, former 
president of the ICI, Nagendra Singh, added that judges "generalise and enunciate 
Matters (Djib. v. Fr.), 2008 I.CJ. Pleadings 23 (Jan. 22, 2008) (citing Enron Corp. & Ponderosa Assets v. 
Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01l3, Award, ~~ 322-45 (May 22, 2007); CMS Gas Transmission 
Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/OIl8, Award, ~~ 353-78 (May 12,2005); Sempra Energy 
Int'l v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, Award, ~~ 364-91 (Sept. 28, 2007)). 
42. IC] Statute, supra note 22, art. 38. 
43. For example, in its Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with Commentaries, the International Law 
Commission commented that "[t]here is much authority in the jurisprudence of international tribunals for the 
proposition that in the present context the principle of good faith is a legal principle which forms an integral 
part of the rule pacta sunt servanda." INT'L LAW COMM'N, DRAFT ARTICLES ON THE LAW OF TREATIES WITH 
COMMENTARIES 211 cmt. 2 (1966). This statement is supported by a discussion of decisions of the IC], the 
Permanent Court ofinternational Justice, and arbitral tribunals. Id. 
44. Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.CJ. 136 (July 9). 
45. G.A. Res. 10/15, at 4, U.N. Doc. AlRESIES-10/15 (Aug. 2, 2004). 
46. See Karin Oellers-Frahm, Lawmaking Through Advisory Opinions?, 12 GERMAN LJ. 1032, 1040-41 
(2011). 
47. See ALTER, supra note 4, at 16-17 (discussing "politically meaningful" rulings that may elicit state 
or government responses); Christina Binder, The Prohibition of Amnesties by the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights, 12 GERMAN LJ. 1203, 1225-26 (2011) (arguing that the prohibition of amnesty laws by the 
Inter-American Court helped domestic courts and human rights constituencies fight impunity). 
48. STURGESS & CHUBB, supra note 34, at 89. 
49. Id. at 90. 
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principles of jurisprudence which would serve as a guide to prevent future disputes and 
to the establishment of a regime of law."5o 
Decisions can shape the law prospectively by creating or limiting rights and 
obligations for nonlitigating states, as well as individuals. For example, the decision of 
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in Barrios Altos v. Peru51 that all amnesty 
laws violate the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights, not just the one 
immediately before the court, impacted all states with such laws that were also parties 
to the Convention. 52 It also created the theoretical possibility for legal relief for many 
individuals whose claims were previously barred by amnesty laws. 
In several recent cases in the IC}, nonlitigants' rights were directly affected by 
proceedings in which they had no right to appear. For example, Jurisdictional 
Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy: Greece Intervening)53 had significant 
impacts on nonlitigating parties. The court ruled that states enjoy jurisdictional 
immunity for acta jure imperU54 occasioning death, personal injury, or damage to 
property committed by armed forces or other state organs in the forum state during the 
course of an armed conflict, and that the gravity of the crimes committed or the lack of 
any other remedy does not warrant a suspension of immunity under customary 
international law as it currently stands.55 As a result, Italian and Greek citizens who 
suffered from massacres of loved ones, forced labor, or improper denials of prisoner of 
war status by the German Reich lost their right to a remedy for serious violations of 
their human rights,56 despite that several human rights instruments require states to 
provide remedies for violations of human rights. 57 Future claimants will suffer the 
consequences of this decision too. 
Similarly, the ICrs advisory opinion in an appeal from a decision of the 
International Labour Organization's Administrative Tribunal dealt directly with the 
50. !d. at 452. 
51. Merits, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 75, (Mar. 14,2001). 
52. Barrios Altos, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 75, ~ 41 (deeming all "amnesty provisions, provisions 
on prescription and the establishment of measures designed to eliminate responsibility" as inadmissible); see 
also Binder, supra note 47, at 1209-11, 1222-26 (discussing subsequent Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights cases relying upon this decision and the reaction of non litigating states). 
53. Judgment, 2012I.C.J. I (Feb. 3). 
54. Acta jure imperii are acts concerning the exercise of sovereign power. Jurisdictional Immunities, 
2012 I.C.J. ~ 60. 
55. !d. ~~ 77, 91,97. 
56. See id. ~~ 104, 139 ("In coming to this conclusion, the Court is not unaware that the immunity from 
jurisdiction of Germany in accordance with international law may preclude judicial redress for the Italian 
nationals concerned. "). 
57. See, e.g., Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment art. 14, adopted Dec. 10, 1984, 108 Stat. 382, 1465 U.N.T.S. 112 (declaring that "[e)ach State 
Party shall ensure in its legal system that the victim of an act of torture obtains redress"); International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 2, adopted Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (requiring each 
signatory to "adopt such legislative or other measures as may be necessary" to ensure available remedies for 
violations of human rights); Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 8, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. 
NRES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948) (declaring that "[e)veryone has the right to an effective remedy by the 
competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or by 
law"). 
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rights of an employee of the International Fund for Agricultural Development.58 
Although the complainant before the Administrative Tribunal had no right to speak or 
to representation derived from the IC] Statute, the IC] gave her the opportunity to 
present her views in writing, implicitly recognizing the direct impact of the case on her 
rights.59 
The Chevron Corp. & Texaco Petroleum Co. v. Ecuadorf'° case in the Permanent 
Court of Arbitration (PCA) is another stark example of how nonlitigants' rights or 
interests may be directly affected by proceedings in which they may play no part. This 
case involved a determination of responsibility over environmental degradation and 
personal injuries that Texaco Petroleum's activities allegedly caused to tens of 
thousands of Ecuadorians.61 After the filing of several lawsuits by both Ecuadorian 
plaintiffs and Chevron in both the United States and Ecuador, Chevron and Texaco 
filed a Notice of Arbitration in the PCA in The Hague, the Netherlands, in 2009.62 
Specifically, Chevron and Texaco alleged that Ecuador violated several provisions of 
the Ecuador-United States Bilateral Investment Treaty, including its obligations to (1) 
provide fair and equitable treatment to the claimants' investment, (2) provide effective 
means of asserting and enforcing rights under the treaty, (3) not to impair a number of 
rights with respect to the use of the investment, (4) not to treat the investment less 
favorably than national investments, and (5) to observe any obligations entered into 
with respect to the investment. 63 Chevron asked the court to declare that it had "no 
liability or responsibility for environmental impact, including but not limited to ... 
human health, the ecosystem, indigenous cultures, [and] the infrastructure."64 The 1976 
Rules of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) 
applicable to this dispute did not provide for amicus curiae, or "friend of the court," 
briefs.65 Consequently, if decisions in this case directly affected the rights or interests 
of indigenous peoples, as Fundaci6n Pachamama and the International Institute for 
Sustainable Development argued in a brief to the PCA,66 the rules provided no right for 
58. Judgment No. 2867 of the Administrative Tribunal of the International Labour Organization upon 
Complaint Filed Against the International Fund for Agricultural Development, Advisory Opinion, 2012 I.C.J. 
I (Feb. I). 
59. Id. '113. 
60. Case No. 2009-23 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2009). 
61. Claimants' Notice of Arbitration '1125, Chevron Corp. & Texaco Petroleum Co. v. Ecuador, Case No. 
2009-23 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2009). In November 1993, a class of 30,000 Ecuadorian plaintiffs sued Texaco, Inc., 
in federal court in the Southern District of New York, for personal injury and damage to their property caused 
by petroleum operations in Ecuador. Id. In May 2003, another set of plaintiffs sued Chevron in Lago Agrio, 
Ecuador, after the 1993 U.S. suit was dismissed for forum non conveniens.ld. '11'1125, 30. 
62. /d. '11'1125, 30. 
63. Id. '1169. 
64. Id. '1176. 
65. Id. at I (stating that the notice was "proceeding under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules"); United 
Nations Commission on International Trade Law Arbitration Rules, G.A. Res. 31/98, U.N. Doc. AlRES/31/98 
(Dec. 15, 1976) (lacking a provision on amicus briefs); see also United Nations Commission on International 
Trade Law Arbitration Rules, G.A. Res. 65/22, U.N. Doc. AlRES/65/22 (Jan. 10,2011) (demonstrating that 
the 2010 revised version of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules also contains no provisions on amicus briefs). 
66. Petition for Participation as Non-Disputing Parties '11'11 3.1, 3.4, Chevron Corp. & Texaco Petroleum 
Co. v. Ecuador, Case No. 2009-23 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2010). The tribunal ruled that nonlitigants had no right to 
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those peoples to seek to influence the decisions of the tribunal. Rather, the only way to 
get their perspective into the litigation would be to rely on Ecuador. Unfortunately, 
there is no guarantee that Ecuador (or any other country) will faithfully represent the 
views of particular interest groups within its borders, and it may have incentives to 
prioritize other concems.67 
International courts may not only directly affect rights and duties of nonlitigants, 
but they may also impact the interests of a variety of stakeholders. For example, the 
IeJ's ruling in the Pulp Mills case68 may affect corporations, individuals, and states 
where corporations intend to undertake development projects with possibly significant 
transboundary adverse impacts. The IeJ faced the question whether Uruguay violated 
the procedural and substantive requirements of the Uruguay River Statute,69 a bilateral 
treaty establishing a prior notification and consultation regime and a regulatory 
framework for limiting water pollution, after Uruguay authorized, constructed, and 
operated a pulp mill on its side of the River Uruguay.70 Within its judgment, the court 
asserted that transboundary environmental impact assessments are required by 
customary international law.11 The court's ruling may affect the rigor of standards for 
environmental impact assessments and, consequently, a company's choice to undertake 
a project or a state's decision to grant authorizations for construction and operation of 
facilities in a transboundary context.12 The decision may impact how international 
financial institutions and private banks evaluate loan applications for projects with 
transboundary impacts. Finally, it may affect individuals in both Uruguay and 
Argentina whose views may not have been represented by their states in the courtroom, 
perhaps by modifying economic opportunities or environmental conditions. The IeJ 
Statute and Rules of Procedure afford none of these nonstate stakeholders any right to 
appear before the court or to submit amicus briefs.73 A nonlitigating state may 
file amicus curiae briefs during the jurisdictional phase. Procedural Order No. 8 ~ 20, Chevron Corp. & Texaco 
Petroleum Co. v. Ecuador, Case No. 2009-23 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2011). The request does not appear to have been 
renewed at a later stage of the proceedings. 
67. See Judith Kirnerling, Indigenous Peoples and the Oil Frontier in Amazonia: The Case of Ecuador. 
Chevrontexaco. and Aguinda v. Texaco, 38 NY.U. J. INT'L L. & POL 413, 426-33 (2006) (discussing 
Ecuador's Amazon policy of "internal colonization" and development of oil reserves and its impact on 
indigenous communities); see also Brief for Fundaci6n Pacharnama and the International Institute for 
Sustainable Development as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents ~ 4.7, Chevron Corp. & Texaco Petroleum 
Co. v. Ecuador, Case No. 2009-23 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2010) (describing sources criticizing Ecuador's conduct 
with respect to access to justice for indigenous peoples); Gerald P. Neugebauer III, Note, Indigenous Peoples 
as Stakeholders: Influencing Resource Management Decisions Affecting Indigenous Community Interests in 
Latin America, 78 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1227, 1230, 1237-40 (2003) (pointing to the Ecuadorian Amazon as an 
example of the insufficiency of "relying primarily on governmental mechanisms" to protect the human rights 
afforded to indigenous groups). 
68. Pulp Mills on River Uruguay (Arg. v. Uru.), Judgment, 2010 I.C,J. 14 (Apr. 20). 
69. Statute of the River Uruguay, Uru.-Arg., Feb. 26, 1975, 1295 U.N.T.S. 340. 
70. Pulp Mills, 2010 I.e.J. ~~ 22-23,67. 
7L ld. ~ 204. 
72. See id. ~~ 209-11,223-25 (evaluating whether the specific actions taken by Uruguay complied with 
due diligence requirements for conducting environmental impact assessments). 
73. ICJ Statute, supra note 22, art. 34 (providing that "[o]nly states may be parties in cases before" the 
ICJ). Interestingly, the IC]'s judgment stated, too, that none of the instruments invoked by Argentina 
supported a legal obligation to consult with affected populations. Pulp Mills, 20 I 0 I.C,J. ~ 216. 
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intervene only if the court determines it has "an interest of a legal nature which may be 
affected by the decision in the case."74 States do, however, have the right to intervene if 
the court is interpreting a treaty to which they are parties.75 These requests to intervene 
are rarely granted.76 
In the same vein, several scholars have raised concerns or acknowledged the 
impact of international investment and trade law adjudications on human rights and the 
environment, and thereby, on rights arid stakeholders, through ICSID and the WTO 
Dispute Settlement Body. Among these are former ICJ Judge Bruno Simma, who 
points out the concerns of states, civil society, and NGOs about the impact of 
international investment law on their rights and interests and attempts to put human 
rights in a more prominent place within investment treaty arbitration.77 In response to a 
question about human rights, the environment, and litigation at ICSID, Secretary-
General Meg Kinnear acknowledged that human rights may be linked to investment 
arbitration "when tribunals are looking at cases that arise in a certain context, 
particularly with regards to environmental issues" or when a party is defending an 
expropriation on the basis of police powers. 78 Some have gone so far as to criticize 
ICSID for providing "almost a carte blanche for investor human rights abuses."79 The 
2012 U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty recognizes the interconnectedness of 
international investment law and, therefore, its adjudication, on health, safety, the 
environment, and labor rights.8o It also contains specific provisions on investment and 
the environment, investment and labor rights, and the transparency of investment 
proceedings.81 Similarly, many debate the WTO Dispute Settlement Body's impact on 
the environment, human health, human rights, and numerous stakeholders.82 
74. ICJ Statute, supra note 22, art. 62. 
75. Id. art. 63. The ICJ Statute provides that if states intervene under these circumstances, they are bound 
by the Court's interpretation of the treaty.ld. This raises the interesting theoretical question of whether states 
that do not intervene are also bound. Nonetheless, even if the ICJ Statute implies that they are not formally 
bound, the court's interpretations will undoubtedly shape perceptions of state obligations under the treaty. 
76. See C.M. Chinkin, Third-Party Intervention Before the International Court of Justice, 80 AM. J. 
INT'L L. 495, 531 (1986) (arguing that the ICJ has "denied the mandatory language of Article 63 and 
interpreted Article 62 so narrowly" that state intervention does not seem presently feasible); Sean D. Murphy, 
AmplifYing the World Court's Jurisdiction Through Counter-Claims and Third-Party Intervention, 33 GEO. 
WASH. INT'L L. REv. 5, 21-25 (2000) (discussing the few times that intervention has taken place at the ICJ). 
77. Simma, supra note 5, at 573, 575-76. 
78. ICSID in the Twenty-First Century: An Interview with Meg Kinnear, 104 AM. SOC'y INT'L L. PROC. 
413, 424 (2010). Nonetheless, Secretary-General Kinnear asserted that ICSID is "not a facility that is 
adjudicating human rights." Id. 
79. Noemi Gal-Or, The Investor and Civil Society as Twin Global Citizens: Proposing a New 
Interpretation in the Legitimacy Debate, 32 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REv. 271, 282 (2009). 
80. Office of the U.S. Trade Representative & U.S. Dep't of State, 2012 U.S. Model Bilateral Investment 
Treaty pmbl., http://www.ustr.gov/sites/defaultifilesIBIT%20text%20for''1020ACIEP%20Meeting.pdf. 
81. Id. arts. 12, 13,29. 
82. See Gabrielle Marceau, The WTO Is Not a Closed Box, 100 AM. SOC'y INT'L L. PROC. 29, 30-31 
(2006) (discussing how the WTO often considers nontrade concerns when resolving trade disputes, including 
environmental, health, and religious factors); Joost Pauwelyn, The Transformation of World Trade, 104 MICH. 
L. REv. 1,32 (2005) (explaining how the WTO's consideration of health and environmental standards as they 
relate to the world trade system affected governmental trade elites and businesses, as well as NGOs, 
consumers, and citizens at large); Gary P. Sampson, Is There a Need for Restructuring the Collaboration 
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Traditional approaches to legitimacy recognize neither the impact of international 
courts on nonlitigants nor the changed role of international courts. International courts 
do not just decide one-time disputes between states. Rather, much of the time they are 
involved in advancing particular values or keeping states within a particular normative 
community.83 A number of international court judges appear to perceive themselves as 
advancing a set of values or creating communities around such values, not simply 
resolving one-time disputes. When he served as president of the Inter-American Court 
of Human Rights, Judge Thomas Buergenthal proposed that the court's purpose was to 
create a "climate ... wherein human rights disputes can be depoliticised" and where 
"governments learn to submit themselves to a Tribunal to have a case decided."84 He 
emphasized, too, the importance "of judges whose integrity and commitment to human 
rights is beyond question."85 Although he rejected the proposition that judges can be 
policy-making activists, he suggested that "you can be an activist in terms of believing 
that law plays an important role in resolving some of the societal problems that create 
these terrible violations of human rights we've experienced."86 Similarly, former 
ECHR Judge John Hedigan lauded the ECHR's role in promoting human rights 
throughout Europe, as follows: 
I think that the individual is the most precious form in society. The 
relationship between the state and the citizen-the individual-lies at the 
very heart of civilization. That they're treated with decency and respect, can 
stand up and say their piece whenever they want, that they're not going to be 
tortured, or abducted, or imprisoned for their views or their religion-these 
are precious and vulnerable rights. I think the court is spreading those 
standards all over Europe. The things that are happening in this regard, and 
that have happened in Europe over the last half a century, are remarkable.87 
In the same vein, the ECJ has been an important force in the constitutionalization 
of Europe. ECJ rulings "transformed the Treaty of Rome into a de facto constitution for 
the European Community."88 Former president of the ECJ, Lord Mackenzie Stuart, 
acknowledged the ECl's role in promoting European integration: "The foundation of 
Among the WTO and UN Agencies so as To Harness Their Complementarities?, 7 J. Im'L ECON. L. 717, 721 
(2004) (noting that "the WTO dispute settlement process finds itself dealing with cases relating to 
nontraditional trade areas such as the environment and public health."); Mrujorie Cohn, The World Trade 
Organization: Elevating Property Interests Above Human Rights, 29 GA. J. INT'L & COMPo L. 427, 431 (2001) 
(describing how the WTO consistently rules in favor of big business rather than in the interest of protecting the 
environment). 
83. See Yuval Shany, Assessing the Effectiveness of International Courts: A Goal-Based Approach, 106 
AM. J. INT'L L. 225, 246 (2012) (explaining how international courts advance the goals of the institutional 
regimes to which they are connected such as the European Union or WTO). Like domestic courts, international 
ones are involved in "social control." SHAPIRO, supra note 27, at 22, 26. Martin Shapiro proposes that courts 
have moved away from the ideal type of two litigants choosing a third person to resolve their disputes. Id. at I. 
Rather, courts-and judges-are associated with the imposition of particular substantive norms of those ruling 
the broader society. Id. at 22, 26. "Thus a major function of courts in many societies is a particular form of 
social control, the recruiting of support for the regime." Id. at 22. 
84. STURGESS & CHUBB, supra note 34, at 534. 
85. Id. 
86. Id. at 118-19. 
87. TERRIS ET AL., supra note 32, at 220 (emphasis added). 
88. Alter & Helfer, supra note 36, at 564. 
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the Community is an act of political will and if, from time to time, it is lacking, the 
court may, by an interpretive process here and there, deblock negotiations."89 It is 
remarkable how explicit these judges are in recognizing their role in creating 
communities and promoting norms. 
Although this Article focuses on noncriminal courts, examples abound in the 
realm of international criminal law as well. For example, the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTy) has justified at least two decisions in light 
of the purposes of international humanitarian law. The ICTY Appellate Chamber 
rejected the defense of duress in a case involving crimes against humanity partly to 
effectuate the goals of international humanitarian law.9o When faced with a question 
with no clear legal answer, it "assert[ ed] an absolute moral postulate which is clear and 
unmistakable for the implementation of international humanitarian law."91 Similarly, 
the ICTY Appellate Chamber in Prosecutor v. Tadi(;92 noted that its decision to 
characterize the conflict in Bosnia as "international" was "borne out by the entire logic 
of international humanitarian law,"93 which it further noted is "a realistic body of law, 
grounded on the notion of effectiveness and inspired by the aim of deterring deviation 
from its standards to the maximum extent possible."94 The underlying goals of the body 
oflaw at issue were a driving force in the ICTY's decision making. 
2. Why These Changes Render Traditional Approaches Anachronistic 
International courts shape the law prospectively and affect actors beyond the 
litigants immediately before the court. They are engaged in perpetuating values and 
maintaining normative communities. These acknowledged realities of international 
adjudication mandate taking a second look at traditional approaches to legitimacy such 
as consent and procedural fairness to litigants alone. 
The state consent approach is flawed because it assumes international courts' 
exclusive role is to decide one-time disputes involving states and that a decision's 
impact is limited to the litigating parties. The state consent approach supposes that 
states are sovereign and independent, and therefore no court can judge them without 
their consent. Yet international court decisions affect nonlitigating states. Various 
89. STURGESS & CHUBB, supra note 34, at 494. Lord Stuart also noted that the court did so when it 
indicated it was unnecessary for the council to issue "directives about free movement of persons because the 
right was a fundamental one already inscribed in the Treaty." Id. He noted, however, that "it is a dangerous 
tendency ... to think that the court can do more than it really can." Id. 
90. Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, Case No. IT-96-22-A, Judgement of the Appeals Chamber, ~ 4, 19 (lnt'! 
Crim. Trib. for the Fonner Yugoslavia Oct. 7, 1997); Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, Case No. IT-96-22-A, Joint 
Separate Opinion of Judge McDonald and Judge Vohrah, ~ 80, 83 (lnt'l Crim. Trib. for the Fonner 
Yugoslavia Oct. 7,1997). 
91. Erdemovic, Case No. IT-96-22-A, Joint Separate Opinion of Judge McDonald and Judge Vohrah, 
~ 80, 83 (emphasis added). The Judgment of the Appeals Chamber incorporates the reasoning of Judge 
McDonald and Judge Vohrah's joint separate opinion on the issue of whether duress constitutes a complete 
defense to a charge of crimes against humanity. Erdemovic, Case No. IT-96-22-A, Judgement of the Appeals 
Chamber, ~ 19. 
92. Case No. IT-94-I-A, Judgement of the Appeals Chamber, (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Fonner 
Yugoslavia July 15, 1999). 
93. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-I-A, Judgement of the Appeals Chamber, ~ 96. 
94.Id. 
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international judges like those quoted above appear to see themselves as responsible for 
establishing and maintaining a kind of international rule of law. Courts routinely 
change the international legal obligations of nonlitigating states even if those states did 
not consent to jurisdiction. Even if the relevant treaty allows a state to opt out of 
compulsory jurisdiction, a decision can still be used as a focal point for domestic and 
international actors to pressure the state. Under the traditional state consent approach, 
making new law applicable to all states should render a court illegitimate. But if a 
court's job is to promote human rights, then a decision that promotes human rights may 
be legitimacy enhancing, regardless or even because of its impact on nonlitigating 
states. 
The state consent approach to legitimacy is flawed for another reason. Nonstate 
actors' rights and duties may be directly affected by international courts, yet their 
consent appears irrelevant. The traditional story is that states were the only subjects, or 
legal persons, addressed by intemational law. Only states could possess rights and 
duties to the exclusion of nonstate actors.95 Other legal persons are widely recognized 
today, such as international organizations,96 individuals,97 and corporations.98 State 
consent to jurisdiction matters to legitimacy, at least in part, because adjudication 
affects states' rights and obligations. But even when adjudication affects a nonstate 
actor's rights and obligations, the nonstate actor plays no role in consenting to its 
jurisdiction. Although states presumably represent their people when they decide to 
join a dispute resolution regime, some states are undemocratic, barely democratic, or 
represent only the views of empowered elites. Even in representative states, people's 
views may change over time, and it may be impractical or impossible for a state to 
95. JANNE ELISABETH NUMAN, THE CONCEPT OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PERSONALITY: AN INQUIRY 
INTO THE HISTORY AND THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 10 (2005). 
96. See Reparation for Injuries Suffered in Service of United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1949 I.C.J. 
174, 187 (Apr. II) (holding that the United Nations, acting as an organization, may pursue an international 
claim against a state government to obtain reparations for damage suffered); Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties Between States and International Organizations, Mar. 21, 1986, 25 I.L.M. 543; Responsibility of 
International Organizations, Rep. of the Int'l Law Comm'n, 63d Sess., Apr. 26-June 3, July 4-Aug. 12,2011, 
U.N. Doc. N66/10; GAOR, 66th Sess., Supp. No. 10 (2011) (discussing the responsibilities of international 
organizations under international law). 
97. See THEODOR MERON, THE HUMANlZA TION OF INTERNA TlONAL LAW I (2006) (describing the impact 
of human rights and humanitarian law on many other parts of international law and asserting that "[t]he 
humanization of public international law under the impact of human rights has shifted its focus above all from 
State-centered to individual-centered"); MARIo PROST, THE CONCEPT OF UNITY IN PUBLIC iNTERNATIONAL 
LAW 5 (2012) (describing the shift of the role of individuals in international law from "mere objects" to 
"holders of international rights that are actionable in court"). International human rights law bestows 
individuals with a panoply of rights. American Convention on Human Rights arts. 4, 5, 6, Nov. 22,1969,1144 
U.N.T.S. 123; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 57, arts. 18,21; International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights arts. 6, II, 15, adopted Dec. 16, 1966,993 U.N.T.S. 3; 
ECHR, supra note 24, arts. 3, 9. Also, individuals have standing to pursue claims against states for violating 
human rights treaties. E.g., Statute of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, O.A.S. Res. 447 (IX-
0/79) (1979); Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, supra note 24, arts. 
19-51; Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Establishment of an African 
Court of Human and People's Rights art. 30, June 9, 1998, Doc. OAUILEGIEXP/AFCHPRlPROT(III). 
98. For example, corporations have the right to sue states in NAFTA and ICSID. ICSID Convention, 
supra note 23, art. 25; North American Free Trade Agreement ch. XI, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 
I.L.M. 289; PROST, supra note 97, at 5. 
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disentangle itself from a dispute resolution system. If a state consented fifty years ago, 
does that confer legitimacy on a court today? The consent principle has itself lost force, 
and many scholars of international legitimacy believe it is at most a weak basis for the 
legitimacy of international institutions.99 
Although his focus is on domestic courts, perhaps Martin Shapiro provides an 
alternative formulation of this critique. Shapiro declared that domestic courts rarely 
conform to the ideal type of "(1) an independent judge applying (2) preexisting legal 
norms after (3) adversary proceedings in order to achieve (4) a dichotomous decision in 
which one of the parties was assigned the legal right and the other found wrong."IOO 
Instead, he argues that consent and the independent judge have been replaced by 
judicial office and law. lol In other words, individuals no longer choose the adjudicator 
and rules to be applied, but rather, they are subject to society's choice of adjudicator as 
well as society's values and preferences as expressed by its laws. The same goes for 
international courts. Consent becomes less meaningful as the foundation of 
international courts' legitimacy when jurisdiction is essentially compulsory or consent 
was expressed fifty years ago. And international courts may promote values that 
diverge from what states consented to in the first place. The point is that while state 
consent may matter for legitimacy, it is an insufficient basis for legitimacy standing on 
its own. 
The procedural fairness to litigants approach to legitimacy, too, is difficult to 
reconcile with the realities of international adjudication. Again, international court 
decisions affect nonJitigants. Yet the procedural fairness approach as traditionally 
understood leaves no role for them. Taking the most extreme example, imagine an 
individual whose rights and duties under international law are being adjudicated by the 
decision of an international court. Assume the individual has no standing, has no right 
to file an amicus brief, and proceedings are closed to the public. If all other 
requirements are met, such a court is legitimate according to the traditional procedural 
fairness approach. The focus on procedural fairness to litigants alone leaves an 
enormous blind spot in assessments of normative legitimacy. 
The procedural fairness approach assumes the existence of neutral or impartial 
adjudicators and benches or panels of adjudicators. Such adjudicators presumably view 
facts objectively, favor neither party to a dispute, and have no goals besides dispute 
resolution. Yet the reality is that adjudicators introduce outside interests into 
adjudication all the time, such as those of the institution or actor that appoints them. 102 
99. Cesare P.R. Romano, The Shift from the Consensual to the Compulsory Paradigm in International 
Adjudication: Elementsfor a Theory of Consent, 39 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 791, 794-95 (2007); Meyer & 
Sanklecha, supra note 13, at 4-5; Richard Falk & Andrew Strauss, On the Creation of a Global Peoples 
Assembly: Legitimacy and the Power of Popular Sovereignty, 36 STAN. J. INT'L L. 191, 208 (2000); Allen 
Buchanan, The Legitimacy of International Law, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 79, 90--91 
(Samantha Besson & John Tasioulas eds., 2010); Wolfrum, supra note 16, at 9; Tasioulas, supra note 13, at 
20--21. 
100. SHAPIRO, supra note 27, at I. 
101. Id. at 18. 
102. Martin Shapiro discusses these interests in the domestic context: 
When the two parties must go to a third who is an officer, it is as evident to them as to the observer 
that they are no longer going to a disinterested third. Instead they are introducing a third interest: 
2013] THE NORMATIVE LEGITIMACY OF INTERNATIONAL COURTS 79 
These may include preservation of power relationships, human rights or free trade 
promotion, protection of state sovereignty, environmental concerns, and favoring 
peaceful conflict resolution over justice, or vice versa. Judges' professional and 
personal identities and goals may also influence adjudicatory outcomes. 103 A 
nearsighted focus on procedural fairness solely to litigants ignores the recognized and 
evolving roles, objectives, and impacts of international courts. 
III. A NEW APPROACH TO NORMATIVE LEGITIMACY 
The traditional approach to normative legitimacy for international courts is deeply 
flawed. State consent and procedural fairness to litigants alone are insufficient to 
ground the legitimacy of international courts. Yet crafting a new approach presents 
daunting challenges. First, such a theory must recognize the new realities of 
international adjudication, including that international adjudication affects the rights, 
responsibilities, and interests of nonlitigating states and nonstate actors, and 
international courts do not solely decide one-time disputes but rather are involved in 
creating norms over time. Merely acknowledging in a footnote that states are no longer 
the sole subjects of international law is insufficient. 104 The theory must incorporate 
these realities to be useful. "Prescription aims at a particular normative goal, but it must 
take into account present reality in order to achieve that goal."105 
Simultaneously, despite all the changes in the role of nonstate actors in the 
international system and the growing implications of international court proceedings 
for nonlitigants, the theory must still recognize that states may withdraw their consent 
to jurisdiction from many international courts or simply stop using them if it becomes 
unduly burdensome to do so. The theory must be sensitive to the practical reality that 
states continue to playa pivotal role in the success of international dispute resolution. 
Without states, there would be no international courts. As Lukas H. Meyer and Pranay 
Sanklecha point out, if a normative theory fails to take into account empirical realities, 
its principles are useless ("practical irrelevance").106 Yet giving politics the upper hand 
in crafting normative theory may result in the endorsement of injustice ("adaptive 
preference"). 107 This Article seeks to strike some imperfect balance between the two. 
A second challenge to building a coherent theory is the diversity of the dozens of 
international courts operating today. They differ on the breadth of their subject matter 
that of the government, the church, the landowner, or whoever else appoints the official. 
Id. 
103. See, e.g., Nienke Grossman, Sex on the Bench: Do Women Judges Matter to the Legitimacy of 
International Courts?, 12 CHI. J. INT'L L. 647, 656-{;0 (2012) (suggesting that judges' gender may, at times, 
influence their decision making). 
104. See, e.g., FERNANDO R. TEs6N, A PHILOSOPHY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW I (1998) ("Although it is 
understandably hard for lawyers to forsake the statist assumptions of classic international legal discourse, new 
times call for a fresh conceptual and ethical language."); Meyer & Sanklecha, supra note 13, at 14 (arguing 
that an exclusive focus on states seems "at the least, incomplete, leading naturally to the question of how to 
accommodate the widened range of actors within any systematic explanation of what justice (and legitimacy) 
involve at the international level"). 
105. Bodansky, supra note 9, at 314. 
106. Meyer &. Sanklecha, supra note 13, at 19. 
107. Id. 
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jurisdiction, whether their jurisdiction is compulsory, the standing they afford to 
nonstate actors, the transparency of their procedures, and the availability of 
enforcement mechanisms. And "[ w ]hat is required in order to legitimise an institution 
may vary depending on how much authority it is exercising, the kind of authority it is 
exercising, and the kinds of issues it is exercising authority over."108 Consequently, a 
theoretical framework must be broad enough to accommodate the various courts within 
its scope, yet narrow and concrete enough to be useful. The goal, after all, is to be able 
to use the theory to evaluate the legitimacy of various international courts, to learn 
from the differences among courts, and to craft legitimacy-enhancing institutional 
reforms. 
A third challenge to creating a theory of justified authority for international courts 
is the scarcity of universal objective principles in a world of seven billion people. 
Normative legitimacy is supposed to be grounded in objective principles, while 
sociological legitimacy depends on perceptions and is agent relative. 109 State consent is 
an attractive source of legitimacy because it allows states to choose for themselves 
what values they will ascribe to. To the extent the theory grapples with the relationship 
between the justice of institutional outputs and legitimacy, it must acknowledge the 
narrowness of consensus on the meaning of ''justice.''11O Further, a theory of normative 
legitimacy should also acknowledge that such a consensus may change over time. I II 
A fourth hurdle is distinguishing between what matters to legitimacy and what is 
simply good policy for reasons unrelated to legitimacy. What underpins legitimacy, as 
opposed to the rule of law, justice, or something else? One way that scholars have 
systematically approached legitimacy theory is by examining it through the lens of 
inputs, process, and outputs. State consent and procedural fairness to litigants fall into 
the input and process categories, respectively, while justice is linked to outputs. I 12 This 
Article proposes both procedural and substantive requirements for legitimacy. 
Despite these and other challenges, building a new theory is vital. Applying an 
outmoded approach to legitimacy engenders a false sense of security about 
international courts' health and viability. Also, enough commonality exists among 
international courts to merit a fieldwide theory. At the highest level of generality, all of 
these institutions were created by states to assist in the resolution of disputes governed 
by international law. They are staffed by nationally diverse persons who are 
knowledgeable in international law. They fmd facts, identify and interpret relevant 
rules, fill in gaps in the law when necessary, and apply rules to facts. Building a theory 
of legitimacy that spans international courts can push scholars and court reformers to 
think more broadly and deeply about international adjudication. Further, it can 
108. Bodansky, supra note 9, at 316. 
109. E.g., Bodansky, supra note 8, at 601; Grossman, supra note 10, at 115-16. 
110. See Buchanan & Keohane, supra note 7, at 412 (discussing disagreement on the meaning of 
·~ustice"). 
III. Alternatively, one could disregard whatever consensus exists on the meaning of justice and attempt 
to deduce ftrst principles independently of consensus. This Article prefers to rely on states' common 
understanding to avoid charges of "practical irrelevance," while remaining aware of the risk. Meyer & 
Sanklecha, supra note 13, at 19. Further, virtually all universally held beliefs about justice are likely to reflect 
ftrst principles to some extent. 
112. E.g., Wolfrum, supra note 16, at 6-7. 
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encourage the imagination and evaluation of institutional reforms, which may enhance 
these institutions' legitimacy. Without legitimacy, international courts, especially those 
with weak enforcement mechanisms, are doomed to irrelevance and ineffectiveness. 
In spite of the difficulties in crafting a new theory of normative legitimacy, this 
Section proposes one. First, Part lIlA sets forth a broader vision of procedural fairness 
that includes both stakeholders and rights holders. The remainder of Section III 
describes substantive requirements; Part III.B discusses justice, while Part IILC is 
concerned with faithfulness to the object and purpose of the norms being interpreted 
and applied. The hope is that this theory will serve as a starting point for future debate 
and discussion about the normative legitimacy of international courts. 
A. Reimagining Procedural Fairness 
Legitimacy requires that international courts allow nonlitigants to participate in 
international court proceedings in at least two instances. First, when an international 
court is deciding a dispute that adjudicates a nonlitigant's international rights and 
obligations, the nonlitigant must have a fair and impartial hearing. Widely recognized 
notions of due process support this proposition. Second, when an international court is 
either acting as an organ of global administrative law or is making law, nonlitigating 
stakeholders whose interests are implicated must have the opportunity to influence 
outcomes. This argument is grounded in democratic theory. 
1. Right to a Hearing in Dispute Resolution Proceedings 
Courts must be procedurally fair to be legitimate. The hallmark of procedural 
fairness is affording an impartial hearing to those whose rights and duties are at issue. 
There is no difference in adjudication at the domestic and international levels that 
necessitates a different rule at the international level, except when one of the litigants 
adopts the views of a third~party entitlement holder. Individuals in particular have a 
strong basis in international human rights law for the right to a fair and impartial 
hearing when their rights and obligations are being adjudicated at the international 
level. Nonetheless, international courts must grant hearings only if a legal person can 
show that its rights or duties are being adjudicated by the court in the pending dispute 
and there is broad consensus as to the existence and scope of those rights and duties. 
a. International versus domestic courts and the right to a hearing 
Procedural fairness is an integral part of legitimate adjudication because it allows 
open-minded judges to consider equally the views of the parties whose rights and 
duties are at stake. Conversely, it provides entitlement holders equal opportunities to 
attempt to influence the outcome in a case that directly implicates them. There is no 
difference in the adjudicative function at the international and domestic levels that 
justifies a different relationship between procedural fairness and legitimate adjudication 
at the international level. 113 Both an international court deciding the course of a 
113. See Paul Mahoney, The international Judiciary - Independence and Accountability, 7 L. & PRAC. 
INT'L CTS. & TRIBUNALS 313, 317 (2008) (making an analogous argument about judicial independence at the 
national and intemationallevels). 
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maritime boundary among three states and a domestic court deciding the property line 
between three houses must provide all sides with equal and unbiased opportunities to 
present their arguments. The ICI has itself recognized the importance of including all 
states whose rights and duties are necessarily adjudicated in a particular case. In 
Monetary Gold Removed from Rome in 1943 (Italy v. France, United Kingdom, 
Northern Ireland, and United States),114 the ICI dismissed Italian claims for want of 
jurisdiction because adjudication required a determination of Albania's international 
legal responsibility, and Albania had not consented to the court's jurisdiction. Jl5 
Whether the court is international or domestic or whether states or nonstate actors are 
involved is irrelevant. What matters is that a judicial institution is deciding a dispute 
among a set of entitlement holders, and all of them must be heard for the procedural 
fairness requirement to be met. If a court refuses to listen to one of them, its legitimacy 
is in peril. 
A state's ability to access and participate in judicial proceedings on behalf of its 
nationals does not obviate the need for nonstate actors to represent themselves. First, 
there is no guarantee that their views will be represented. Governments may be 
undemocratic, unrepresentative, or even if democratic, guided by a small subset of 
elites with unique interests far removed from those of much of the population. Also, 
there may be transnational groups with rights being adjudicated in a dispute who are 
not represented by a state. For example, imagine a border dispute involving two states 
and a people who lives in both states but constitutes a majority in neither. Neither state 
may choose to represent that people's views during litigation. Procedural fairness 
requires that those whose entitlements are being adjudicated have the opportunity to 
advocate for their rights. 
Nonetheless, if an entitlement holder's position is being represented by a 
litigant-if it adopts the entitlement holder's views-then procedural fairness does not 
require a separate hearing. For example, if Georgia files suit against Russia in the ICI 
for violations of the Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, then 
those allegedly suffering racial discrimination as a result of Russia's conduct need no 
separate hearing. Georgia is representing their views directly. In other words, 
procedural fairness requires a third-party hearing only if the state refuses to or cannot 
make the entitlement holder's case in its own presentation to the international court. 
h. The right to a hearing for individuals 
Additionally, the right to an impartial hearing for individuals, as opposed to other 
subjects of international law, can be grounded in international human rights law. 
Several widely ratified international treaties and customary international law require 
states to provide persons whose rights are being adjudicated with an impartial hearing 
in the domestic context or due process rights. Global and regional treaties and the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights seek to guarantee the right of individuals to 
access and participate in judicial proceedings when their rights and obligations are at 
issue. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (lCCPR) provides that 
114. Preliminary Question, 1954I.C.J. 19 (June 15). 
115. See Monetary Gold, 1954 I.C.J at 32-33 ("To adjudicate upon the international responsibility of 
Albania without her consent would run counter to a well-established principle of international law."). 
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"[i]n the detennination of any criminal charge against him, or of his rights and 
obligations in a suit at law, everyone shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a 
competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law."116 The right to a fair 
hearing is of such high stature that the Human Rights Committee, the expert body 
charged with the ICCPR's interpretation, considers reservations to it inconsistent with 
the object and purpose of the treaty as a whole. 117 Similarly, the American Convention 
on Human Rights states: 
Every person has the right to a hearing, with due guarantees and within a 
reasonable time, by a competent, independent, and impartial tribunal, 
previously established by law, in the substantiation of any accusation of a 
criminal nature made against him or for the detennination of his rights and 
obligations of a civil, labor, fiscal, or any other nature.118 
The European Convention provides: "In the detennination of his civil rights and 
obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and 
public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal 
established by law."\l9 The African (Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights 
states that "[e]very individual shall have the right to have his cause heard."120 This right 
includes "the right to an appeal to competent national organs against acts of violating 
his fundamental rights as recognized and guaranteed by conventions, laws, regulations 
and customs in force" and "the right to be tried within a reasonable time by an impartial 
court or tribunal."121 The Convention on the Rights of the Child, too, grants a child the 
right to express his or her views "freely in all matters affecting the child," and to this 
end, "the child shall in particular be provided the opportunity to be heard in any judicial 
and administrative proceedings affecting the child, either directly, or through a 
representative or an appropriate body."122 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, too, supports the proposition that 
individuals should have the opportunity to participate in the adjudication of their rights. 
It provides that every person is entitled to "a fair and public hearing by an independent 
and impartial tribunal, in the detennination of his rights and obligations and of any 
criminal charge against him."123 The Universal Declaration has the status of customary 
international law and is an authoritative interpretation of the human rights provisions of 
116. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 57, art. 14. One hundred sixty-
seven states are parties to this treaty. United Nations, Status of Treaties, International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights I, http://treaties.un.orgidoclPublicationlMTDSGNolurne%20IlChapter''1o20IVIIV-4.en.pdf. 
117. See U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 32, ~ 5, U.N. Doc. CCPRIC/GC/32 (Aug. 
23, 2007) ("[AJ general reservation to the right to a fair trial would be incompatible with the object and 
purpose of the Covenant."). 
118. American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 97, art. 8(1). 
119. ECHR, supra note 24, art. 6(1). 
120. African [Banjul] Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights art. 7, June 27,1981,1520 U.N.T.S. 217. 
121. [d. 
122. Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 12, adopted Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3. One 
hundred ninety-three states are parties to this convention. United Nation, Status of Treaties, Convention on the 
Rights of the Child I, http://treaties.un.orgldoclPublicationlMTDSGNolume%20IlChapter%20NIIV-
Il.en.pdf. 
123. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 57, art. 10. 
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the United Nations Charter. 124 
Although these instruments generally refer to the right of individuals to a fair and 
impartial hearing in a national court or tribunal, there is no difference in the 
adjudicative function that justifies limiting the right to a fair and impartial hearing only 
to those whose rights are being adjudicated domestically.125 Again, litigants may not 
represent the views of other entitlement holders. Further, it is difficult to argue against 
the proposition that international adjudication should meet minimum due process 
requirements found in human rights instruments. 126 In this vein, the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights urges the progressive implementation of measures 
"national and international" to secure the observance of human rights, which include 
the right to a fair hearing. 127 Just as legitimacy at the domestic level requires 
participation of those whose rights and duties are being adjudicated, so too does 
legitimacy at the international level. Giving courts authority to adjudicate the rights and 
obligations of voiceless rights holders is a serious threat to their legitimacy and fails to 
account for the wide recognition of individuals as subjects of international law. When 
international courts adjudicate the rights and duties of individuals, basic notions of due 
process and international human rights law require the provision of some sort of 
hearing. 
c. What kind a/right requires a hearing? 
Procedural fairness requires a hearing only if the legal person can show that its 
international rights or duties are being adjudicated by the court in the pending dispute, 
and there is broad consensus as to the existence and scope of those rights and duties. 
Individuals possess a wide range of rights under the laws of their own states, as 
well as rights and duties derived from various areas of international law, including 
human rights, investment, and criminal law. Only when an international court is 
adjudicating a person's entitlements under international law is a hearing in an 
international court necessary. Domestic courts are best poised to interpret their own law 
because of their knowledge and experience. Also, international courts lack the authority 
to make judgments concerning violations of domestic law. For example, no hearing is 
required for an individual at the international level because her domestic civil rights are 
potentially harmed by the decision of an international court. Concretely, individuals in 
Uruguay and Argentina would have no right to a hearing before the ICJ in the Pulp 
124. Antonio Augusto Cancado Trinidade, Introductory Note, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
Audiovisual Library of International Law, http://legal.un.orglavl/ha/udhr/udhr.html; Thomas M. Franck, The 
Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86AM. J. INT'L L. 46, 61 (1992). 
125. See Mahoney, supra note 113, at 317 (arguing that there is "no discernible reason" that the 
principles governing domestic adjudicative bodies would not govern international adjudicative bodies). 
126. KLABBERS ET AL., supra note 15, at 128. Although this argument is frequently made in international 
criminal court circles, it is virtually absent in international civil court ones. See, e.g., David Luban, Fairness to 
Rightness: Jurisdiction, Legality, and the Legitimacy of International Criminal Law 13-16 (Georgetown Univ. 
Law Ctr., Working Paper No. 67, 2008) (discussing the link between legitimacy and procedural fairness on 
international criminal tribunals). 
127. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 57, pmbl., art. 10. Article 28 provides that 
"[ e ]veryone is entitled to a social and international order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in this 
Declaration can be fully realized." Id. art. 28. 
2013] THE NORMATIVE LEGITIMACY OF INTERNATIONAL COURTS 85 
Mills case unless they could allege a violation of individual international legal rights. 
Procedural fairness does not require international courts to afford a hearing to someone 
whose domestic legal rights alone are at issue. 
A person can demand a hearing under this theory only if he or she can show broad 
consensus regarding the existence and scope of the asserted international legal right or 
duty. By requiring those who seek a hearing to demonstrate that the right or duty 
asserted is accepted by a significant majority of the international community, or the 
relevant regional community of states, international courts cannot be charged with 
applying unfair or unknown standards to state behavior. For example, clarity and 
consensus are lacking concerning the meaning and legal status of several purported 
rights. Numerous international human rights instruments layout dozens of rights, often 
with vague and aspirational language. Not all states have ratified all the relevant 
treaties, and many have made numerous reservations. Saudi Arabia's understanding of 
human rights may be very different from Norway's. Also, their understandings may 
change over time. To decide if broad consensus exists about the existence and scope of 
a right, a court could look at the number of states that are parties to treaties establishing 
the right and reservations to it, commentary by authoritative treaty bodies, state 
practice, opinions of relevant regional and state courts, statements by states and experts 
in the field, and resolutions passed in international organizations. 
These factors strictly limit the situations in which a legal person can obtain a 
hearing. Two examples are useful to understand the circumstances in which a hearing is 
required. Take a border dispute between two countries where an ethnic minority spans 
the border. If the international court decides on the course of the border, it will de facto 
adjudicate the right of self-determination of the minority group. If neither state chooses 
to argue the position of the ethnic minority, and broad consensus exists concerning the 
status and core meaning of the right to self-determination, then the minority group must 
have a right to be heard during the course of the adjudication. 
What about the Chevron-Ecuador litigation?128 Employing the approach set forth 
in this Part, the PCA would have needed to determine whether that litigation would de 
facto adjudicate the international legal rights of indigenous peoples. The PCA would 
consider a number of factors, including whether consensus exists as to the scope of the 
international legal rights allegedly at issue. Also, if Ecuador is adopting the same 
arguments as the indigenous peoples seeking a hearing as part of its response to the 
litigation, then the PCA could reject their request for a hearing. These can be high bars. 
H is difficult to make a judgment as to how a court might come out with respect to 
Fundaci6n Pachamama and the International Institute for Sustainable Development, 
two NGOs that submitted petitions for participation as amici in the jurisdictional phase 
of the litigation, because the petitions were not drafted with these standards in mind. 129 
Nonetheless, they argue that a decision of the PCA could affect indigenous peoples' 
international legal rights to access justice. 130 
128. See supra notes 6()-{)7 and accompanying text for a discussion of Chevron v. Ecuador. 
129. See supra note 6S---{)6 and accompanying text for an explanation of the right to file amicus curiae 
briefs during the jurisdictional phase. 
130. Brief for Fundaci6n Pachamama and the International Institute for Sustainable Development as 
Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, supra note 67, ~ 4.8 
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d. What kind of hearing is required? 
Let us assume that an individual meets the narrow threshold requirements to 
obtain a hearing in an ongoing dispute being adjudicated by an international court. 
What kind of hearing is required? Individuals must be afforded an opportunity to 
present views about the implications of the case for their rights and to have an impartial 
court address those views in its decision making. More specifically, individuals must 
have the chance to provide their perspectives to the court on how international law 
relevant to their rights and duties constrains the actions of the litigating parties. 
In order to present views, persons must have access to both the oral and written 
pleadings of the parties at the time they are presented to the court in a language 
accessible to them. They must be permitted to attend hearings of the court and review 
any decisions the court has made in the case. The court could decide whether to allow 
the presentation of views in writing or orally. 
The right to a hearing is meaningless without an impartial tribunal. Judges' 
identities, how and by whom they were appointed, their education, their professional 
reputation, and whether they hope to secure appointments in the future may influence 
judicial decision making.!3! What would a court impartial to both states and other 
rights holders look like? If only states are involved in judicial selection, judges may 
prize states' rights over individual ones, or they may have a narrower view of which 
kinds of rights should receive the attention of international courts. States could modify 
the qualifications requirements for international judges, draft new judicial oaths of 
impartiality, or create nominating committees for international courts that include 
nonstate actors. They could include, or continue to include, representativeness 
requirements within courts' statutes.!32 They could also allow individuals the right to 
name their own judge to a tribunal. 
Other models are possible. The point is that once it is recognized that nonlitigants' 
rights and duties are being adjudicated in international courts, they must have the 
opportunity to present their views to an impartial tribunal to satisfy the procedural 
fairness requirements of legitimacy. 
e. What if a conflict arises? 
In the narrow circumstances where a nonstate third party may have rights being 
adjudicated in an international court proceeding, how should a court address the new 
party's concerns? States have a wide range of obligations to each other that touch on 
different substantive areas of international law such as trade, use of force, 
environmental law, and human rights law. At the same time, these obligations are 
intended to regulate states' conduct with respect to other states, as well as other 
international legal persons, such as individuals, corporations, and sometimes 
international organizations. What if these obligations conflict? Should some obligations 
131. E.g., Simma, supra note 5, at 576-77 (sensing "a bit of reticence ... vis-a-vis human rights" in the 
foreign investment and arbitration profession and questioning whether it "might be in the investment 
arbitrators' genes" because most have a private or commercial rather than public law background). 
132. See Grossman, supra note 105, at 668-70 (discussing sex representativeness requirements on 
various international courts). 
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take precedence over others? As the 2S6-page Report of the Study Group of the 
International Law Commission on Fragmentation of International Law demonstrates, 
these are complex questions that merit further study and reflection.133 At a minimum, 
this Article proposes in Part III.B that international courts must prize some core set of 
human rights above all other obligations of the state. 
2. Stakeholder Participation in Judicial Law or Policy Making 
Must international courts provide the opportunity to participate to those who have 
interests in what direction law or policy takes, but no specific right or duty being 
adjudicated in any particular dispute? Because state consent and procedural fairness to 
litigants alone are insufficient to justify the authority of international courts engaging in 
law or policy making, one way international courts can justify their authority is by 
providing stakeholders with participation rights. 
Democratic theory can provide a justification for the exercise of public authority 
of international COurtS. 134 Democratic models are many and varied, but they generally 
include elements of representation, participation, accountability, and deliberation. 135 
Although one could analyze the applicability and role of all of these elements in 
justifying the authority of international courts, this Article limits itself to a discussion 
of one of the most fundamental "building block[s] of democracy"-participation by 
those affected. 136 Participation in the conduct of public affairs is an integral part of 
democracy. "[D]emocracy requires that all those whose basic interests are affected by 
policy decisions are able to participate directly or indirectly in the process of making 
them."137 Participation not only allows those affected to influence judicial processes, 
but it also provides opportunities to monitor what is taking place and to utilize 
mechanisms of control and accountability outside the courthouse. 
But how does one justify the application of this democratic principle to 
international institutions and to international courts in particular? Different states have 
different approaches to governance. Even if one ascribes to democracy at the domestic 
level, it does not easily or automatically apply at the international one. For example, the 
demos is more readily identifiable at the state level but not necessarily at the 
international one. 138 Further, democratic principles are generally applied to political 
133. See generally Fragmentation o/International Law: Difficulties Arisingfrom the Diversification and 
Expansion o/International Law, Rep. of the Study Group of the Int'I Law Comm'n, 58th Sess., May I-June 9, 
July 3-Aug. 11,2006, U.N. Doc. AlCN.4fL.682; GAOR, 58th Sess., Supp. No. IO (2006). 
134. See Annin von Bogdandy & Ingo Venzke, On the Democratic Legitimation 0/ International 
Judicial Lawmaking, 12 GERMAN LJ. 1341, 1343 (2011) (contending that "(dJemocratic justification is 
ineluctable for the exercise of any public authority"). 
135. See Grliinne De Burca, Developing Democracy Beyond the State, 46 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 
221,227 (2008) (discussing participation and representation of affected parties); J.H.H. Weiler, The Geology 
0/ International Law - Governance, Democracy and Legitimacy, 64 Heidelberg J. Int'I L. 547, 560 (2004) 
(referencing representation, accountability, and deliberation as democratic values). 
136. De Burca, supra note 135, at 227. 
137. Samantha Besson, Institutionalising Global Demoi-cracy, in LEGITIMACY, JUSTICE AND PUBLIC 
INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 13, at 66, 66. 
138. See Weiler, supra note 135, at 560 (asserting that while a demos is presumed in states, there is no 
clear demos at the international level). 
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institutions such as legislatures, not to courts. Finally, applying democratic principles 
to international institutions may fail to recognize that international institutions lack the 
social and political conditions for democracy at the domestic level, such as an 
individual right to vote, majoritarian decision making, a global public in constant 
communication over public issues, free press and media, and institutions to check 
abuses of power. 139 These arguments may explain why so few have grappled with the 
democratic legitimacy of international tribunals. 14o 
As this Part argues, despite differences in state approaches to governance, 
numerous global and regional treaties and soft law instruments support the proposition 
that individuals, and sometimes even NGOs, have a right to take part in the conduct of 
public affairs. Undemocratic and unrepresentative states, as well as transnational 
constituencies, make it necessary to effectuate opportunities for participation at the 
international level, although these instruments generally refer to the domestic one. The 
activities of international courts are close enough to the conduct of public affairs, at 
least some of the time, to necessitate some kind of democratic justification. Further, 
because international courts are not embedded in a constitutional framework, the need 
for democratic justification is particularly salient. A number of institutional changes are 
necessary to bring about participation at the international court level. 
Importantly, the objective is not to recreate domestic democracy at the 
international level to achieve legitimacy, nor to apply the principles of domestic 
democracy in the same way to international courts as to domestic legislatures. For 
example, participation may not take the same form at the domestic and international 
levels. It may apply to different kinds of institutions in different ways. Instead, the goal 
is to find some way to legitimate the power of institutions that exercise authority over 
both state and nonstate actors, yet where the latter may play no role whatsoever in 
decision-making processes. In 1.H.H. Weiler's words: 
What is required is both a rethinking of the very building blocks of 
democracy to see how these mayor may not be employed in an international 
system which is neither State nor Nation and to search for alternative 
legitimating devices which would make up for the non applicability of some 
of the classical institutions of democracy where that is not possible.1 41 
Participation in the conduct of public affairs is one such building block.142 
a. Participation in the conduct of public affairs 
Not only democratic theory discusses the importance of the participation of those 
affected in the formulation of policies that impact them. Numerous global and regional 
international treaties and soft law instruments articulate a right to take part in the 
conduct of public affairs. For example, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
139. Buchanan & Keohane, supra note 7, at 416. 
140. See KLABBERS ET AL., supra note 15, at 150. But see von Bogdandy & Venzke, supra note 14, at 
979. 
141. Weiler, supra note 135, at 561. 
142. See De BUrca, supra note 135, at 227 (identifying the "fullest possible participation and 
representation of those affected' as "one particular building block of democracy"). 
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provides that governments should reflect the "will of the people,"143 and that 
"[e]veryone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or 
through freely chosen representatives" and "the right of equal access to public service 
in his country."I44 The ICCPR similarly states that "[e]very citizen shall have the right 
and the opportunity ... [t]o take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or 
through freely chosen representatives."145 The Human Rights Committee described this 
article of the ICCPR as addressing "the right of individuals to participate in those 
processes which constitute the conduct of public affairs."146 It noted that the conduct of 
public affairs is "a broad concept which relates to the exercise of political power, in 
particular the exercise of legislative, executive and administrative powers. It covers all 
aspects of public administration, and the formulation and implementation of policy at 
international, national, regional and locallevels."147 
Regional human rights treaties as well as International Labour Organization 
Convention 169 recognize the importance of the right to participate in public affairs. 
For example, the American Convention on Human Rights states that every citizen has 
the right to "take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen 
representatives."148 The African Charter contains similar language. 149 International 
Labour Organization Convention 169 also imposes obligations on states to consult 
indigenous peoples in formulating policies that concern them. For example, it states 
that governments must "consult the peoples concerned ... whenever consideration is 
being given to legislative or administrative measures which may affect them directly" 
and must "establish means by which these peoples can freely participate, to at least the 
same extent as other sectors of the population, at all levels of decision-making in 
elective institutions and administrative and other bodies responsible for policies and 
programmes which concern them."150 
The international community has put special emphasis on the right to participate 
in policy making with environmental consequences. For example, Principle 10 of the 
Rio Declaration on Environment and Development states that: 
Environmental issues are best handled with the participation of all concerned 
citizens, at the relevant level. At the national level, each individual shall 
have appropriate access to information concerning the environment that is 
held by public authorities, including information on hazardous materials and 
activities in their communities, and the opportunity to participate in decision-
143. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 57, art. 21. 
144. ld. 
145. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 57, art. 25. 
146. Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 25, The Right to Participate in Public Affairs, Voting 
Rights and the Right of Equal Access to Public Service, ~ 2, U.N. Doc. CCPRIC/21/Rev.lIAdd.7 (July 12, 
1996). 
147. ld. ~ 5. 
148. American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 97, art. 23. 
149. African [Banjul] Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, supra note 120, art. 13. 
ISO. International Labour Organization Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention (No. 169) art. 6, 
adopted June 27,1989,28 I.L.M. 1382. The convention grants peoples the right to participate in policy making 
that may affect them directly. ld. art. 7. Indigenous peoples are to have access to legal proceedings for the 
protection of their rights. !d. art. 12. Also, the treaty states that a primary goal of education of indigenous 
children is to help them participate in both their own and national communities.ld. art. 29. 
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making processes. States shall facilitate and encourage public awareness and 
participation by making information widely available. Effective access to 
judicial and administrative proceedings, including redress and remedy, shall 
be provided. 151 
The United Nations Environment Programme developed draft guidelines for the 
implementation of Principle 10 in 2010. These guidelines provide that states must 
ensure that members of the public, including both individuals and NGOs, have the 
opportunity to participate meaningfully in environmental decision making and be 
informed of this opportunity.152 The United Nations Economic Commission for 
Europe's Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-
making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, commonly known as the 
Aarhus Convention, contains many similar provisions. 153 Although the guidelines and 
the convention are limited to environmental decision-making processes, they are 
significant because they enshrine the right of both individuals and NGOs to seek to 
influence policy making and to access and use courts to vindicate their rights. 
Although these instruments usually, although not exclusively, refer to 
participation in national policy making, the point is that individuals have a right to take 
part in the formulation and implementation of policies that affect them. If states were 
truly representative, perhaps it would be unnecessary to give effect to such a right at the 
international level. States would represent their people, and there would be no need for 
"interference" by nonstate actors, except perhaps for transnational constituencies. Yet 
because many states are unrepresentative, undemocratic, or captured by powerful elites, 
individuals and other nonstate actors frequently have no ability to influence policy 
making or administration taking place in international courts, even if it impacts their 
interests directly. The failure to include individuals who are affected threatens 
international courts' legitimacy. It excludes from the purview of policyrnakers or 
administrators the voices of those whose lives may be most deeply altered by the 
policies they craft. 
b. International courts and the conduct o/public affairs 
Participation in the conduct of public affairs is generally understood in relation to 
the exercise of political power and administration. 154 This Part proposes that the 
activities of international courts, at least some of the time, fall within these categories. 
lSI. United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, Braz., June 3-14, 
1992, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, U.N. Doc. A1CONF.151/26IRev.1 (Vol. I), Annex I 
(Aug. 12, 1992). 
152. Governing Council of the V.N. Env't Programme, Guidelines for the Development of National 
Legislation on Access to Information, Guideline 8, adopted by the Governing Council in decision SS.xIl5, part 
A (Feb 26, 2010). 
153. Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to 
Justice in Environmental Matters arts. 1,3,9, June 25,1998,2161 V.N.T.S. 447 (forty-five parties as of May 
15,2012). 
154. See The Right to Participate in Public Affairs, Voting Rights and the Right of Equal Access to 
Public Service, supra note 146, ~ 25 (providing for "the free communication of information and ideas about 
public and political issues between citizens, candidates and elected representatives is essential" to enjoy 
freedom to engage in political activity). 
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Further, international courts are generally not embedded in a constitutional system of 
checks and balances, so participation by those most affected is a meaningful way of 
justifying their authority. 
International courts' power frequently extends beyond merely deciding a one-time 
dispute. They are part of the architecture of global governance. An international court 
or tribunal is not a legislature at the international level. Yet international courts are 
engaged in law making. And the activities of some international courts, at least some of 
the time, have been characterized as regulatory or administrative in nature. Nico Krisch 
and Benedict Kingsbury define global administrative bodies as those engaged in 
administrative and regulatory functions, or "the setting and application of rules by 
bodies that are not legislative or primarily adjudicative in character."155 They propose 
that WTO dispute resolution can, in many cases, be regarded as "another layer of 
judicial review of domestic administrative action" and as part of a widely variegated 
"global administrative space."156 1.H.H. Weiler, too, notes the emergence of a 
"regulatory layer" in the international legal system and situates activities of the WTO 
within it. 157 Similarly, Gus Van Harten and Martin Loughlin argue that investment 
treaty arbitration constitutes "a powerful species of global administrative law" because 
its norms and mechanisms "exert a strong disciplinary influence over domestic 
administrative programrnes."158 
Global administrative law applies administrative law principles to bodies engaged 
in administration, including international courts. It arises from the idea that global 
governance is a form of administration and that administration can be influenced by 
administrative law principles. 159 These include principles derived from democratic 
theory, like procedural participation, transparency, and reasoned decisions. 160 To the 
extent that these bodies are a part of a global-administrative or policy-making space 
rather than a traditional dispute-settlement mechanism, it is fitting to apply global 
155. Nico Krisch & Benedict Kingsbury, Introduction: Global Governance and Global Administrative 
Law in the International Legal Order, 17 EUR. J. INT'l L. 1,3 (2006). 
156. Id.; see also G. Richard Shell, Trade Legalism and International Relations Theory: An AnalYSis of 
the World Trade Organization, 44 DUKE LJ. 829,914 (1995) (asserting that the WTO acts as a regulatory 
agency that fonnulates and adjusts trade policy among large democratic states). 
157. Weiler, supra note 135, at 549-50. 
158. Gus Van Harten & Martin Loughlin, Investment Treaty Arbitration as a Species of Global 
Administrative Law, 17 EURO. J. INT'l L. 121, 122 (2006); see also David Livshiz, Note, Public Participation 
in Disputes Under Regional Trade Agreements: How Much Is Too Much-The Case for a Limited Right of 
Intervention, 61 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 529, 532-33 (2005) (characterizing the activities of dispute 
settlement institutions provided by regional trade agreements as "analogous to that of a traditional 
administrative agency"); Jason Webb Yackee, Controlling the International Investment Law Agency, 53 
HARv.INT'l LJ. 391, 394 (2012) (analogizing the international investment law to an administrative agency). 
159. Krisch & Kingsbury, supra note ISS, at 3. 
160. See, e.g., Benedict Kingsbury et aI., The Emergence of Global Administrative Law, 68 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. IS, 37-39 (2005) (highlighting the procedural participation, transparency, and reasoned 
administrative decisions reflected in global administrative practice); Krisch & Kingsbury, supra note ISS, at 4 
(stating that transparency, participation, and review are emerging as mechanisms in global regulatory decision 
making). But see Carol Harlow, Global Administrative Law: The Questfor Principles and Values, 17 EUR. J. 
INT'l L. 187, 187,213 (2006) (arguing that such principles are based mainly in Western legal approaches and 
are leading to an undesirable "juridification" of political processes). 
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administrative law principles, which often reflect democratic ones, to them. 161 
Furthennore, whether engaged in administration or law making, international 
courts are much more difficult to hold accountable than domestic ones. The concern 
that domestic legal scholars raise about the countennajoritarian difficulty162 is 
exacerbated at the international level. The difference is that international courts already 
make decisions that legislatures would at the domestic level. Armin von Bogdandy and 
Ingo Venzke call this phenomenon the "decoupling of law from parliamentary 
politics."163 And often there is no legislature at all to counteract the activities of 
international courts, as they are rarely embedded in a constitutional framework of 
checks and balances. l64 While states may, in some cases, withdraw from an 
international court's jurisdiction or refuse to implement its decisions if they are not 
directly enforceable, other international actors may have no way of influencing the 
decision-making process unless a litigant in a case adopts their views. The case for 
democratic controls, including enhanced participation, is much stronger at the 
international level than at the domestic one. 
c. Who gets to participate and can enhanced participation be antidemocratic? 
One of the challenges of applying democratic theory to the international legal 
system is detennining who the demos is. 16S Is it states, peoples, individuals, women, 
indigenous persons, or corporations? To whom are international courts supposed to be 
accountable? In short, who gets to participate? The democratic principle at issue here is 
that those whose interests are affected by the decisions of international courts should 
have some ability to participate in their processes. 166 In other words, the demos is the 
diverse set of beneficiaries of international court decision making. The demos can also 
be called stakeholders. Stakeholders must have some meaningful interest in the 
direction that the law may take in a particular dispute. The law at issue must be relevant 
to the conduct of public affairs; it must transcend the boundaries of the dispute before 
the court and have some broader impact beyond the litigating parties. In this vein, some 
courts and tribunals have already limited the use of amicus briefs to disputes 
161. See Krisch & Kingsbury, supra note 155, at 4 (stating that "building mechanisms analogous to 
domestic administrative law systems" has become a trend in the area of global governance). 
162. See Jeremy Waldron, The Core o/the Case Against Judicial Review, 115 YALE L.J. 1346, 1348-50 
(2006) (analyzing the "counter-majoritarian difficulty" countries face when allowing courts to invalidate 
legislation). 
163. von Bogdandy & Venzke, supra note 14, at 993. 
164. See id. at 993-95 (finding that the "main avenue of democratic legitimation"-the separation of 
powers--is strained in the international context). 
165. See Besson, supra note 137, at 68 (stating that no set criteria exists for establishing whether a 
multitude of people is a demos or a political community); Nico Krisch, The Pluralism o/Global Administrative 
Law, 17 EUR. J. iNT'L 1. 247, 247 (2006) (noting the problem of determining to whom global governance 
should be accountable); Weiler, supra note 135, at 560 (discussing the difficulty of determining who the 
demos is in a democracy). 
166. See Besson, supra note 13 7, at 66 (proposing that democracy mandates that those whose interests 
are affected by policies are able to participate in the process that makes those policies); De BUrca, supra note 
135, at 276-77 (asserting that participation by all interested individuals is an essential element of the 
"democratic-striving" approach). 
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concerning the "public interest" alone. 167 
The counterargument from a democratic theory standpoint is that opening up the 
international courthouse doors to expanded participation will not enhance the 
democratic legitimacy of the decisions of international COurtS. 168 Those with the means 
and motive to make their voices heard, including NGOs and corporations, may not 
have spotless democratic credentials. Further, those who speak the most or the loudest 
may not represent the majority of the world.169 Finally, the state, where numerous 
interests must compete and compromise with each other, is the right place for these 
kinds of discussions, not international courts. 170 States represent the relevant 
stakeholders. 
International courts can institutionalize safeguards to address these concerns. 
They can adopt approaches to limit the type of stakeholder who gets to participate. For 
example, courts could mandate that nonlitigants apply for some kind of consultative 
status or preauthorization before a particular dispute resolution system. In Measures 
Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, the WTO Appellate Body 
required nondisputing, nonstate actors wishing to file amicus briefs to make a number 
of showings, including that their contributions would help to resolve the pending 
dispute in accordance with WTO law and would not duplicate arguments of parties or 
third parties to the dispute. 171 Similarly, the IeSID Arbitration Rules grant tribunals the 
authority to allow nondisputing parties to file written submissions after consultation 
with the parties to the dispute, so long as the submission addresses a matter within the 
scope of the dispute.172 The rules also consider whether the submission "would assist 
the Tribunal in the determination of a factual or legal issue related to the proceeding by 
bringing a perspective, particular knowledge or insight that is different from that of the 
disputing parties," and whether the nondisputing party has "a significant interest in the 
proceeding." 173 
167. Eric De Brabandere, NGOs and the "Public Interest": The Legality and Rationale of Amicus 
Curiae Interventions in International Economic and Investment Disputes, 12 CHI. J. INT'L L. 85, 102-03 
(2011). 
168. See, e.g., Trachtman & Moremen, supra note 2, at 227-28 (questioning the democratic credentials 
of nonstate actors such as NOOs and corporations). 
169. For example, Egypt argued that allowing amicus briefs at the WTO would give NOOs in developed 
countries more of a voice than those from the developing world because the former have greater access to 
resources and time. Appellate Body Meeting Minutes, Communication from the Appellate Body to the 
Chairman of the Dispute Settlement Body on Europoean Communities - Measures Affecting Asbestos and 
Asbestos-Containi~g Products, ~ 21, WT/OCIMl60, (Jan. 23, 2001). 
170. See Trachtman & Moremen, supra note 2, at 227-28 (arguing that permitting private participants to 
engage in WTO dispute settlement does not enhance the legitimacy of the process because the 
''unidimensional'' perspectives and interests of private participants are not on par with the multifaceted 
interests of the states that currently participate in WTO dispute settlement). 
171. Appellate Body Communication, European Communities - Measures Affecting Asbestos and 
Asbestos-Containing Products, ~ 3(1), WTfDS 13519 (Nov. 8, 2000). 
172. ICSID Rules of Procedure for Arbitration Proceedings, Rule 37(2), available at 
https:llicsid.woridbank.orgllCSID/StaticFileslbasicdoc/partF-chap04.htm#r37. 
173. [d. The tribunal also has the responsibility of ensuring, through consultation with the disputing 
parties, that the submission of the nondisputing party "does not disrupt the proceeding or unduly burden or 
unfairly prejudice either party." [d. 
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Alternatively, if these safeguards are deemed insufficient by a particular dispute 
resolution body, states could establish standards by which to judge the democratic 
credentials of these groups. Another approach is for states and stakeholders to create a 
list of broad categories that nonlitigants are allowed to address, like impact on the 
environment, human rights, or economic growth, and force various groups to 
collaborate on a single brief to address each broad issue. Finally, courts could 
themselves ask nonlitigants whose views they believe are relevant and unrepresented to 
make a submission. 
Arguing that the place for democratic dialogue is at the domestic level is easy 
when one comes from a democratic state. Yet many potential participants do not. Even 
when they do, the state may have ignored the views of a particular group in its internal 
decision-making process. A group may be traditionally discriminated against by the 
state, as indigenous people frequently are, or it may be transnational and possess little 
gravitas within the borders of anyone state. One could attempt to force democratic 
contestation to take place at the domestic level by requiring states to submit their 
litigation strategy ideas to the public for comment, as at least one free trade agreement 
did. 174 Nonetheless, if a state systematically discriminates, or if a transnational group is 
involved, true democratic contestation is unlikely to take place. In other words, the 
international court may be the only place where a multitude of interested voices is 
heard. 
d. What does participation in the conduct o/public affairs look like? 
The right to participate in the conduct of public affairs requires some commitment 
to transparency. Pleadings and hearings must be open and accessible for nonlitigants to 
determine whether they have interests at issue and whether they have something unique 
and worthwhile to contribute to the discussion. Some courts' official languages are not 
in the language-or even the common language-of the litigating parties, making it 
very difficult for stakeholders to comment on what the court is doing, or even on their 
own state's behavior in the proceedings. Similarly, simultaneous transcription or 
televised hearings should be the norm for international courts located across the world 
from where their rulings will be felt. 
What should the involvement of the public look like? Different courts may adopt 
different methods. One option is to allow stakeholders to file amicus briefs. Even if 
their rights are not directly at issue, stakeholders should have the opportunity to present 
relevant points as the court makes decisions that will shape the law prospectively. 
Again, especially when states are unrepresentative, amicus participation is perhaps the 
only formal way that nonstate actors and nonIitigants can influence policy making 
taking place in international courts. If an overwhelming number of groups or 
individuals seek to file amicus briefs, courts can develop methods by which to screen 
and filter the number of briefs, including establishing in which areas they wish to hear 
contributions and ensuring that submissions are not duplicative. 
Several tribunals have already moved in the direction of allowing amicus 
participation for nonstate actors. For example, human rights courts such as the ECHR 
174. United States-Singapore Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 108-78, 117 Stat. 
948 (2003). 
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and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights typically accept amicus briefs. 175 
Nonetheless, although the WTO and international investment tribunals increasingly 
permit the use of amicus briefs as a policy matter,176 Eric De Brabandere points out that 
"there has not yet been substantial effective acceptance or consideration of such 
submissions in particular cases."177 Other international courts, including the ICJ, do not 
allow for amicus participation at all in contentious cases.178 
Another approach is to create a new position in the secretariats of these various 
international courts to advise them on the impact of their decision making on 
nondisputing parties. This person could present the court or tribunal with information 
about the potential impact of its decisions on nonlitigants whose interests are 
implicated in the case. Stakeholders could share their concerns and arguments with this 
person who would present them to the tribunal. Such an advisor would have to possess 
excellent credentials and credibility and the ability to absorb and condense information 
gleaned from a number of sources. 
Regardless of whether an institutional advisor or amicus briefs are used, 
adjudicators must be open to the arguments of nonlitigants for their participation to be 
meaningful. They must not prize the interests of the litigating parties over those of 
other nonlitigating parties, so long as the nonlitigating parties make arguments relevant 
to determination of the underlying dispute. This may require input from nonstate actors 
in the appointment of judges and arbitrators. Finally, adjudicators must consider the 
views of nonlitigants in their decision making to the extent that they matter for 
resolution of the underlying dispute. 
As nonstate actors are increasingly recognized as holders of rights and duties 
under international law, their exclusion from processes that adjudicate their 
175. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, supra note 24, art. 
36(2) (providing that "[t]he President of the Court may, in the interest of the proper administration of justice, 
invite any High Contracting Party which is not a party to the proceedings or any person concerned who is not 
the applicant to submit written comments or take part in hearings"); Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights, art. 44, approved by the court during its 85th regular period of sessions, held from 
Nov. 16-28,2009, available at http://www.corteidh.or.crlsitiosireglamento/nov_2009_ing.pdf. 
176. Although the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding does not provide for amicus participation, 
the Appellate Body ruled in the United States-Shrimp and United States-Lead and Bismuth II cases that WTO 
panels and the Appellate Body have the power to accept amicus briefs. See Appellate Body Report, United 
States - Import Prohibition a/Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products" 91, WTIDS58/ABIRW (Oct. 22 2001) 
(admitting amicus briefs attached to the United States' submission); Appellate Body Report, United States -
Imposition 0/ Countervailing Duties on Certain Hot-Rolled Lead and Bismuth Carbon Steel Products 
Originating in the United Kingdom" 39, WTIDSI38/ABIR (May 10,2000) (fmding that the WTO Appellate 
Body has "the legal authority to decide whether or not to accept and consider any information that we believe 
is pertinent"). Similarly, the ICSID Arbitration Rules now too allow for submissions by nondisputing parties, 
upon consultation with the litigating parties. ISCID Convention Regulations & Rules, Arbitration Rule 37(2), 
Apr. 2006, available at http://icsid.woridbank.org/lCSID/StaticFileslbasicdoc/CRR _ English-final.pdf; see also 
Methanex Corp v. United States, Decision of Tribunal on Petitions from Third Persons to Intervene as Amici 
Curaie",47, 53 (Jan. 1,2001 NAFTAIUNCITRAL) (stating that NAFTA tribunals have the power to accept 
amicus curiae submissions). 
177. De Brabandere, supra note 167, at 87. 
178. See ICJ Statute, supra note 22 (containing no provisions on amicus submissions by nonstate actors); 
SHABTAI ROSENNE, 2 THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT, 1920-1996, at 653-54 (3d ed. 
1997) (stating that IC] practice "does not envisage" the presentation ofargurnents by nonstate actors). 
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entitlements and shape their interests threatens to undermine the authority of 
international courts and tribunals. It becomes difficult to justify international courts' 
authority when extended over persons who lack the ability to participate or sometimes 
even to access judicial proceedings that adjudicate their international legal rights and 
obligations or shape public policy. Legitimacy requires a reimagining of procedural 
fairness to account for both rights holders and stakeholders. 
B. What About Justice (or Substantive Legitimacy)? 
Many have shied away from justice as important to legitimacy in the international 
arena. Fewer still have explicitly applied such a lens to international courts. This Part 
argues that substantive justice can and should be an important part of legitimacy for 
international courts. 
Most scholars have steered away from justice in the legitimacy debate for a 
number of reasons. Allen Buchanan and David Golove propose that legal realists, who 
view international relations as a Hobbesian state of nature, and legal nihilists, who 
contend that international law is not law, have traditionally dominated the field of 
international legal philosophy and see no place for moral theorizing. 179 Thomas Franck 
hesitated to probe the linkages between justice and legitimacy for both "operational" 
and "theoretical" reasons. 180 Operationally, justice can only be done to people, not 
entities like states, and international law primarily addresses states, not individuals, 
making it quite complicated to discern workable principles of justice. 181 For example, 
John Rawls's suggestion of putting foreign ministers behind a "veil of ignorance" to 
discern principles of justice would result in rules that favor states' interests over those 
of individuals. 182 Foreign ministers would likely arrive at a rule of nonintervention, 
which would allow for genocide, and therefore cannot be juSt. 183 Second, from a 
theoretical perspective, distinguishing between justice and legitimacy allows for the 
development of principles that acknowledge and accommodate the existence of 
different moral communities, while postponing debate on the meaning of justice. 184 
Despite his discomfort with engaging in the justice debate, Franck simultaneously 
embraced the centrality of justice: "[a]s the firm outlines of world order become readily 
apparent, and as that order increasingly focuses on the individual's place in global 
society, a keener understanding of the theory, function, and power of justice must 
surely move to the top of the agenda."18S 
Franck's operationalization critique is less powerful than it used to be. First, 
international law is increasingly recognized to address the rights and duties of actors 
179. Allen Buchanan & David Golove, Philosophy of International Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 871, 872-73 (Jules Coleman & Scott Shapiro eds., 2002); see also 
Caron, supra note 5, at 514 (stating that "[i]n general, critiques of legitimacy-at least in legal scholarship-
often are directed to procedural rather than substantive legitimacy"). 
180. THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS 208--09 (1990). 
181. Id. 
182. Id. at 218--21 (citing JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 7 (1971). 
183. Id. at 221. 
184. Id. at 236. 
185. /d. at 246. 
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beyond states, especially natural persons. While it may be primarily aimed at states, 
international law contains much about the rights and duties of human beings, without 
whom states would not exist in the first place. It may be challenging to discern 
workable principles of justice for a multifarious world of international actors, but the 
pursuit of justice remains an important objective of international law. 186 Second, by 
excluding all international actors except states, one limits the capacity to think 
creatively and deeply about both justice and legitimacy. 
As for the theoretical critique, Franck's "firm outlines of world order" are more 
apparent. 187 While discerning a common standard of justice in a world of seven billion 
people, states, corporations, and international organizations is a daunting challenge, a 
growing consensus exists that justice requires, at a minimum, some recognition of the 
freedom and equality of human beings. 188 As explained below, the international 
community, through treaties and other sources of international law, has deemed 
violations of some human rights so egregious that it forbids their commission under 
any circumstances. It has reached some agreement on justice, or rather injustice. So 
long as international courts help states to better respect these substantive legal 
obligations than they would on their own, Joseph Raz's service conception of authority 
links justice and legitimacy.189 Further, courts cannot condone or facilitate the violation 
of a minimum core set of human rights and remain legitimate. 
1. A Minimum Core Set of Human Rights 
The international community agrees that some core set of human rights exists that 
should not be violated in any circumstance. Both global and regional treaties prohibit 
derogation from a limited subset of rights even during public emergency or war. For 
example, the ICCPR, regardless of the existence of a public emergency, forbids states 
from derogating from (1) rights to life, freedom from torture, and freedom from 
slavery; (2) freedom from imprisonment for failure to fulfill a contractual obligation; 
(3) freedom from the application of ex post facto laws in criminal trials; (4) recognition 
as a person before the law; and (5) freedom of thought, conscience and religion. 190 The 
Convention Against Torture, too, declares that "[n]o exceptional circumstances 
whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of war, internal political instability or any 
186. See Mortimer Sellers, Parochialism, Cosmopolitanism, and Justice, in PAROCHIALISM, 
COSMOPOLITANISM, AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 13, at 250, 259 (stating that 
the "purpose oflaw and the international community is justice," as recognized by the United Nations Charter); 
Martti Koskenniemi, Book Review, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 175, 178 (1992) (discussing the "essential continuity 
and embeddedness" of law and justice); W. Michael Reisman, Theory About Law: Jurisprudence for a Free 
Society, 108 YALE L.J. 935, 939 (1999) (describing Myres McDougal and the New Haven School's 
jurisprudential "insistence that the end of law and the criterion for appraisal of particular decisions was their 
degree of contribution to the achievement of a public order of human dignity"). 
187. FRANCK, supra note 180, at 246. 
188. See TES6N, supra note 104, at I (arguing that "the end of international law must ... be to benefit, 
serve, and protect human being"); Buchanan & Golove, supra note 179, at 876--77 (explaining that the 
expanding global culture of human rights reflects a conception of justice based on "the recognition of the 
equality and freedom of all persons"). 
189. See infra Part 1l1.B.2 for an analysis ofRaz's service conception of authority. 
190. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 57, arts. 4, 6, 7, II, 15, 18. 
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other public emergency, may be invoked as a justification of torture."191 Similarly, the 
Genocide Convention declares that states must commit themselves to prevent and 
punish genocide, "whether committed in time of peace or in time ofwar."192 
The American Convention on Human Rights provides that states may not suspend 
the rights to juridical personality, life, humane treatment (freedom from torture), 
freedom from slavery, freedom from ex post facto laws, freedom of conscience and 
religion, rights of the family, right to a name, rights of the child, right to nationality, 
right to participate in government, or of judicial guarantees essential for the protection 
of such rightS. 193 The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms establishes that no derogation is permitted during a time of 
emergency from the rights to life (unless from lawful acts of war), freedom from 
torture, freedom from slavery, and freedom from ex post facto laws}94 The African 
Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights does not contain a nonderogation clause. 195 But 
the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights has already declared Articles 7 
(fair trial rights, no application of ex post facto laws), 2 (non-discrimination), and 3 
(equal protection) as nonderogable even in times of emergency; 96 and it may recognize 
more in the future. 197 
The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court provides compelling 
evidence of consensus that a minimum core of human rights guarantees exists that 
should not be violated. Specifically, by describing "the most serious crimes of concern 
to the international community as a whole," including genocide, war crimes, and 
crimes against humanity, the Rome Statute establishes that some violations of human 
rights are so egregious that the international community will condemn and prosecute 
them at the international level. 198 Further, the Rome Statute limits the court to 
application and interpretation of applicable law that is "consistent with internationally 
recognized human rightS."199 That is, in the Rome Statute, the international community 
recognizes that some human rights have the power to trump all other applicable sources 
of law in the International Criminal Court. 
191. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 
supra note 57, art. 2(2). 
192. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide art. I, Dec. 9, 1948,78 
V.N.T.S.277. 
193. American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 97, art. 27(2). 
194. ECHR, supra note 24, arts. 2, 3, 4, 7,15. 
195. African [Banjul] Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, supra note 120; see also V.O. Vmozurike, 
The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 902, 909-10 (1983) (discussing the 
lack of a nonderogation clause in the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights). 
196. Purohit & Moore v. Gambia, Afr. Comm'n on Human & Peoples' Rights., Commc'n No. 241/2001, 
'lJ 49 (2003), available at http://wwwl.umn.edulhumanrts/africalcomcasesI241-200I.html(discussing Articles 
2 and 3); Civil Liberties Organisation, Legal Defence Centre, Legal Defence & Assistance Project v. Nigeria, 
Afr. Comm'n Human & Peoples' Rights, Commc'n No. 218/98, 'lJ 27 (1998), available at 
http://wwwl.urnn.edulhumanrts/africalcomcasesI218-98.html( discussing Article 7). 
197. Adeno Addis, Book Review, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 879, 881-1l2 (2004) (arguing that Article 60 of the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights provides the African Commission on Human and Peoples' 
Rights with the authority to invoke the ICCPR and declare provisions nonderogable). 
198. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 5, July 17, 1998,2187 V.N.T.S. 90. 
199. Id. art. 21. 
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Further, the international community has recognized the existence of jus cogens, 
or peremptory norms that supersede all other sources of legal obligation, as well as 
erga omnes obligations, or duties that states owe to all other states.200 The debate 
continues on what qualifies as a peremptory norm, but the usual suspects include the 
prohibitions against genocide, slavery, torture, and racial discrimination.201 These 
appear to coincide with the nonderogation provisions of the ICCPR, the European 
Convention, the American Convention, and potentially the African Charter, the 
Genocide and Torture Conventions, and conduct deemed criminal by the Rome 
Statute.202 
Publicists, too, have sought to enumerate which rights fall within this category.203 
For example, Allen Buchanan and Robert O. Keohane suggest that the agreed-upon 
core includes rights to physical security, freedom from slavery, servitude and forced 
occupations, and the right to subsistence.204 Similarly, David Miller argues that the 
international community has a responsibility to protect "basic rights" like "rights to 
life, bodily integrity, basic nutrition and health, and so forth."205 
Listing core rights is somewhat controversial and requires greater consensus.206 
For example, feminist scholars assert that political rights are generally overemphasized 
and obviate economic, social, and cultural rights that affect women's lives more 
deeply.207 Third world critiques, too, question the traditional western rights literature as 
leaving out the fundamental concerns of much of the world. 2og Further, one can 
imagine linking justice to an act's impact on the environment or on the equitable 
distribution of resources among different peoples.209 Finally, the set of core rights may 
change over time and may be of greater scope in some regions of the world than 
200. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties arts. 53, 64, opened for signature May 23, 1969, 
1155 V.N.T.S. 331 (stating that all treaties that conflict with peremptory norms are void); Barcelona Traction, 
Light and Power Company, Limited (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3, ~ 33 (Feb. 5) (declaring that states have 
obligations to the international community as a whole). 
201. Erika de Wet, The Emergence of International and Regional Value Systems as a Manifestation of 
the Emerging International Constitutional Order, 19 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 611, 616 (2006). 
202. See supra notes 200-208 for a discussion of the provisions contained within these various charters, 
conventions, and statutes. Customary international law can also provide a source for these prohibitions but is 
not discussed in this Article. 
203. Although their teachings do not constitute a formal source of international law, they can be used as 
a "subsidiary means" for the determination of rules of international law. ICJ Statute, supra note 22, art. 38. 
204. Buchanan & Keohane, supra note 7, at 420. 
205. David Miller, The Responsibility to Protect Human Rights, in LEGITIMACY, JUSTICE AND PUBLIC 
INTERNATIONAL LAW,supra note 13, at 232, 232. 
206. Buchanan & Keohane, supra note 7, at 420 (acknowledging that disagreement exists as to the 
content of core rights). 
207. Hilary Charlesworth et aI., Feminist Approaches to International Law, 85 AM. J. [NT'L L. 613, 634-
36 (1991). 
208. E.g., Makau Mutua, Human Rights and Powerlessness: Pathologies of Choice and Substance, 56 
BUFF. L. REv. 1027,1027-28 (2008). 
209. See Daniel Butt, 'Victors' Justice? Historic Injustice and the Legitimacy of International Law, in 
LEGITIMACY, JUSTICE AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 13, at 163, 164 (arguing that existing 
international law reinforces and preserves unjust resource distribution among states); Alan Boyle, Human 
Rights or Environmental Rights? A Reassessment, 18 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 471, 472 (2007) (discussing 
the relationship between environmental and human rights). 
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others.210 Yet although serious debate exists on the limits of core rights, it is difficult to 
deny that some minimum agreed-upon set exists.2l1 At a bare minimum, this list 
appears to include the prohibitions against genocide, torture, racial discrimination, and 
slavery. 
2. Linking the Core Rights to Legitimacy and Counterarguments 
What is the link between violation of a core set of human rights by states and the 
legitimacy of international courts? This Part provides two answers and seeks to respond 
to some counterarguments. The first answer relies on Raz's service conception of 
authority. The second argues that international courts that facilitate or tacitly assent to 
conduct that the international community as a whole condemns are illegitimate. 
Raz's service conception of authority, the preeminent instrumentalist approach, 
posits that an authority is justified when (1) it takes into account reasons that 
independently apply to the subjects of its directives and are relevant in the 
circumstances ("dependence thesis"), and (2) the subjects are more likely to comply 
with reasons that apply to them independently by accepting and implementing the 
authority's directives than by attempting to follow these reasons on their own ("normal 
justification thesis").2I2 In other words, an authority is justified when its subjects do a 
better job of complying with their obligations by doing what the authority says than 
they would in the authority's absence.213 
International law prohibits states from violating some core set of human rights 
guarantees, no matter what the circumstances. They cannot commit genocide, enslave, 
torture, or engage in racial discrimination. Consequently, an international court's 
authority is justified when it helps states comply with these prohibitions and when it 
takes these prohibitions into account when issuing its decisions. International courts 
can help states to better comply with these requirements because they bring disputes 
from the war room to the courtroom, force state decision makers to view their actions 
through the lens of international law rather than politics, and likely raise the costs of 
noncompliance through judicial judgments and orders. International courts would lack 
legitimacy if states did no better at complying with these human rights guarantees in 
their absence. 
Another argument for the link between injustice and illegitimacy is that 
international courts lack the authority to condone or facilitate state conduct that violates 
these prohibitions. International courts are established by states to apply international 
law. They cannot act in a manner that facilitates the violation of international law, 
especially norms the international community deems of such high stature. To do so 
210. de Wet, supra note 201, at 612-13. 
211. See John Tasioulas, The Legitimacy of International Law, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW, supra note 99, at 97,107 (asserting that scholars' rejection of ethical objectivity is "deeply problematic" 
because it "forecloses on the possibility of radical, non-question-begging criticism of social practices, no 
matter how seemingly wicked"). 
212. RAz, supra note 13, at 47, 53. In recent years, a number of international law scholars have 
examined Joseph Raz's scholarship in the context of the legitimacy of international law. E.g., Meyer & 
Sanklecha, supra note 13, at 5-8; Tasioulas, supra note 211, at 100--11. 
213. The "pre-emption thesis" adds that a legitimate authority'S orders provide a reason for action that 
supersedes some independent reasons. RAz, supra note 13, at 46-47; Meyer & Sanklecha, supra note 13, at 6. 
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would exceed the scope of authority delegated to them. 
But doesn't considering whether a state's behavior violates core human rights run 
contrary to the object and purpose of many of these courts (at least the non-human-
rights ones)? Why should the WTO's Appellate Body and ICSID think about human 
rights when they were established to liberalize trade and promote foreign investment? 
An international court would act beyond the scope of its delegated authority by 
considering issues not raised by the litigating parties. Requiring international courts of 
all kinds to consider the fundamental human rights implications of their decisions is a 
distraction from the primary mission of international courts as dispute settlers. 
Considering whether state action would violate a core set of human rights 
guarantees does not run contrary to the object and purpose of international adjudication 
but rather is consistent with it. The various regimes that an international court may 
address can be considered "mutually supportive."214 The idea is that all international 
rules are part of the same legal system and should be understood as "reinforcing each 
other with a view to fostering harmonization and complementarity, as opposed to 
conflictual relationships."215 None of these courts exist in "clinical isolation" from the 
rest of public international law, including human rights law.216 The duty not to violate 
basic human rights is part of the world of law from which they draw, even if the case at 
issue concerns trade law, the law of the sea, or expropriation.217 Simply, there are some 
lines that international courts cannot cross and still retain their legitimacy.218 
Further, mandating that states comply with a core set of human rights norms is not 
like the application of an ex post facto law. States themselves agreed to be bound by a 
core set of human rights requirements through wide ratification of human rights treaties 
and by virtue of customary international law and jus cogens norms. They have been on 
notice for many years that these are part of their international legal obligations. 
Not only do morality and law require states to act consistent with these human 
rights guarantees, but also mandating that courts consider whether state action will 
violate these rights will strengthen the normative power and appeal of all of their 
decisions. By ignoring states' legal obligations with respect to core human rights, 
214. Riccardo Pavoni, Mutual Supportiveness as a Principle of Interpretation and Law-Making: A 
Watershedfor the 'WTO-and-Competing-Regimes' Debate?, 21 EUR. J. INT'L L. 649, 650 (2010). 
215. /d. at 650. 
216. Appellate Body Report, United States - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, 
17, WTIDS2/ABIR (Apr. 29, 1996); see also Fragmentation of International Law, supra note 133, ~ 45 
(referring to the WTO's decision not to read the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in isolation from the 
rest of international law). 
217. See Joost Pauwelyn, The Role of Public International Law in the WTO: How Far Can We Go?, 95 
AM. J. INT'LL. 535,539 (2001) (discussing the interrelation of trade law and the international legal system). 
218. See KLABBERS ET AL., supra note 15, at 152 (arguing that the decisions of international courts that 
violate international human rights should not be respected by national courts). Fernando Tes6n proposes that: 
All exercise of power must be morally legitimate. Roughly, an exercise of power is morally 
legitimate when it is the result of political consent and respects the basic rights of the individuals 
subject to that power. If international law is to be morally legitimate, therefore, it must mandate that 
states respect human rights as a precondition for joining the international community. 
TES6N, supra note 104, at 2. This argument is similar to Allen Buchanan and Robert O. Keohane's argument 
that global governance institutions must meet some minimum level of moral acceptability for legitimacy. 
Buchanan & Keohane, supra note 7, at 419-422. 
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courts risk undermining their own power in other cases. Imagine if a court denied a 
provisional measures request because it found that state sovereignty trumped an 
ongoing genocide. The taint of the court's decision is likely to spill over into other 
cases and to undermine the court's objectives.219 Is there any way to justify the 
authority of such a court? 
3. Institutional Reforms 
Then what institutional reforms can be made to promote justice? First, states and 
others should engage in an ongoing discussion to determine which additional violations 
of basic human rights they will not permit international courts to condone.220 These 
rights may vary by region or by the subject matter jurisdiction of a particular court. For 
example, parties and stakeholders at ICSID may arrive at a different list than the ICI. 
The emergence of different standards in different courts is not necessarily a cause for 
concern so long as the bare minimum is respected. Second, courts must consider the 
implications of their decisions on the core set of fundamental human rights in each 
decision they make. Third, they must determine whether a conflict exists between the 
core set of individual rights and the other competing rights and obligations at issue in 
the case. Fourth, if a conflict exists, the court must hold these core individual rights 
above any other rights and obligations involved in the case. Courts must help states 
better to comply with core human rights requirements than states would in their 
absence, and international courts cannot cross certain substantive lines and still 
maintain their legitimacy, regardless of competing rights. This approach to legitimacy 
ultimately establishes a normative hierarchy that prioritizes a subset of individual 
human rights (or the duties of states not to violate them) above other rights and duties. 
Consequently, no complex doctrine to reconcile interregime conflicts is necessary, at 
least with respect to this core set of human rights and any other regime.221 Nonetheless, 
the determination of the existence of a conflict may require the development of new 
219. In the same vein, Article 14 of the Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International 
Organizations establishes that: 
An international organization which aids or assists a State or another international organization 
in the commission of an internationally wrongful act by the State or the latter organization is 
internationally responsible for doing so if: 
(a) the former organization does so with knowledge of the circumstances of the internationally 
wrongful act; and 
(b) the act would be internationally wrongful if committed by that organization. 
Responsibility of International Organizations, supra, note 96, art. 14. Article 6 provides that the conduct of any 
organ or agency of the organization is attributable to the organization. Id. 
220. See Buchanan, supra note 99, at 96 (suggesting that the international order cannot rely on universal 
rights as part of its conception of its own legitimacy without providing a "credible public justification for the 
claim that it has properly identified and specified a set of genuinely universal rights"). 
221. Jeffrey Dunoff aptly characterizes these as regime conflicts. Jeffrey L. Dunoff, International Law in 
Perplexing Times, 25 MD. J. INT'L L. II, 21 (2010); see also Dinah Shelton, Normative Hierarchy in 
International Law, 100 AM. J. INT'L L. 291,293 (2006) (discussing the need to further develop choice of law 
principles to address conflicts between norms of equivalent status). Some have looked to Article 31(3)(c) of 
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, distinctions between lex specialis and lex posterior, and the 
concept of jus cogens in response to the challenge of interregime conflicts. Fragmentation of International 
Law. supra note 133, ~ 3; PROST,supra note 97, at 11-12. 
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interpretive tools.222 
C. Achieving Normative Goals 
A second substantive condition of legitimacy for international courts is that they 
must promote the purposes of the normative regimes they are charged with interpreting 
and applying. As discussed above, international courts no longer exist as mere dispute 
settlers but are increasingly recognized to espouse particular normative regimes. 
Simply, as mandated by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,223 a court's 
rulings must be consistent with the object and purpose of the normative regime or 
regimes it was created to adjudicate. For example, if a human rights court ceases to 
protect human rights or fails to uphold states' responsibilities not to violate human 
rights, it no longer possesses justified authority. A court will not lose all legitimacy if it 
makes a mistake in judgment or if it fails to promote its mission in one or two cases. 
Rather, its rulings must accord with the institution's underlying objectives with 
sufficient frequency to justify its authority.224 
This requires identification of the constellation of normative regimes that a court 
should consider (e.g., trade law, environmental law, human rights law, investment law), 
the object and purposes of each of these, and a prioritization of the regimes most 
important within a particular dispute resolution system. Guidance may be found in 
constitutive instruments, relevant treaties, custom and general principles, the court's 
previous interpretations, and critiques by scholars and others. After discerning what 
law applies and what its purposes are, it is essential to understand the overriding goals 
or mission of the court or how it should reconcile conflicting regimes. What hierarchy 
of norms exists in a particular court? In a recent article on effectiveness and 
international courts, Yuval Shany proposed that determining the goals of international 
courts requires identification of mandate providers and analysis of the range and variety 
of their goals.225 Although Shany focused almost exclusively on states and international 
organizations as mandate providers, one can imagine inclusive, public, transparent, and 
periodic dialogue involving other stakeholders concerning evolving goals for various 
international courts. 
Legitimacy requires that normative goals be achieved within the framework of 
justice.226 In other words, a court that facilitates the violation of a core set of human 
rights protections is illegitimate, regardless of whether it achieves other normative 
goals in the process. 
222. See Pavoni, supra note 214, at 650-51 (discussing a shift in the interpretation of multilateral 
environmental agreements to reduce conflicts with WTO rules). 
223. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 200, arts. 31-32. 
224. See RAZ, supra note 13, at 47 (explaining that the normal way to justify an institution's authority is 
not to assume that it will always succeed in behaving ideally, but rather that it will do so often enough to 
justify its own authority). 
225. Shany, supra note 83, at 240-48. 
226. See supra Part III.B for a discussion of legitimacy and justice. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
Traditional approaches to the legitimacy of international courts are based on 
outmoded assumptions about the impact and role of international courts. This Article 
proposes a new theory of legitimacy for international courts with both procedural and 
substantive aspects. First, legal persons whose international legal rights and duties are 
at issue in international court proceedings must have the right to present their views. 
Second, to the extent international courts are making law or policy, those potentially 
affected should have the ability to participate. Third, international courts are legitimate 
when they help states to better comply with a core set of human rights obligations than 
states would without international courts. Fourth, international courts cannot facilitate 
the violation of core norms by states and still retain their legitimacy. Finally, legitimacy 
requires that courts act in a manner generally consistent with the object and purpose of 
the normative regimes they interpret and apply. 
The articulation of this theory shows that much more work remains to be done. 
How should we distinguish between international courts' diverse functions? How do 
we identify the primary normative goals of an international court? Is a diversity of 
normative hierarchies in different courts a threat to the coherence of international 
law?227 This Article takes the position that some basic individual human rights must 
take precedence over other international legal commitments to other actors.228 What 
guidance needs to be provided to courts deciding between norms of equivalent value to 
different international legal persons? To what extent does the type of actor to whom the 
obligation is owed matter? What are the implications for international dispute 
resolution should the scope of core rights grow over time? How would making the 
relatively modest institutional changes that this paper suggests affect the effectiveness 
of international courts? 
More work is needed in the field of comparative international courts as well. 
Which courts are the most and least legitimate? Which ones are farthest behind in 
crafting institutional reforms to attain procedural fairness and justice and better to 
achieve normative goals? Which ones are doing the best job? What can courts and 
court reformers learn from each other's mistakes and successes? If we apply the 
legitimacy standards presented here, where do the various international courts 
operating today fall? For example, the IC] may find itself dangerously far from the top 
of the list. In the IC], no one aside from states has standing in contentious cases or the 
right to file an amicus brief. Parties to the IC] Statute do not meet with any frequency 
to consider amendments. 
The court's record with respect to interregime conflicts involving human rights 
requires more assessment, although in at least two recent cases, it arguably construed 
immunity doctrines to avoid addressing difficult human rights concerns.229 Whether the 
227. See PROST, supra note 97, at 4--7 (discussing the roots of fragmentation and the "anxiety" it 
engenders). 
228. This Article does not transfonn all international courts into human rights courts. Rather, all 
international courts are bound to apply a minimum core set of human rights guarantees agreed to by states, and 
they cannot facilitate the violation of these core nonns. See supra Parts 1II.B.1-2 for a discussion of the 
relationship between core human rights and legitimacy. 
229. See e.g., Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger. v. It.: Greece Intervening), Judgment, 2012 
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court is achieving the nonnative goals within its purview-and what these goals are-
is another matter for debate and discussion. 
International courts have a significant and growing impact on the rights, duties, 
and interests of numerous international actors. Their importance and the increasing 
scope of their authority call for deeper and more creative inquiry about the 
underpinnings of their legitimacy. This Article employs legal philosophy and 
jurisprudential approaches to propose that procedural fairness to rights holders and 
stakeholders and the promotion of relevant nonnative regimes consistent with 
fundamental human rights are essential for the legitimacy of international courts. It 
seeks to motivate stakeholders of all kinds to engage in a serious debate about what 
justifies the authority of international courts and what limits that authority should have. 
I.C.J. I, ~ 91 (Feb. 3) (deciding that states enjoy jurisdictional immunity for acta jure imperii causing injury in 
other states during armed conflict regardless of the gravity of crimes committed or absence of an alternative 
remedy); Arrest Warrant of II April 2000 (Oem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), Judgment, 2002 I.C.J. 3, ~ 54 (Feb. 14) 
(granting an incumbent Minister of Foreign Affairs immunity from criminal jurisdiction outside his home state 
during his tenure). 
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